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The Expressive Function of Directors' 
Duties to Creditors 
Jonathan C Lipson* 
This Article offers an explanation of the "doctrine" of directors' duties to 
creditors. Courts frequently say- but rarely hold- that corporate dncctors 
moe duties to or for the benefit of corporate creditors wizen the corporatiOn IS 
in distress. These cases are puzzling Jar at least two reasons. 
First, they link fiduciary duty to priorihf in right of payment, effectiuely treating creditors as if they were shareho[ders, at least for certarn purposes. 
But thzs ignores the fact that priority is a complex and volatile concept. 
Moreover, contract and other rights at law usually protect creditors, even 
(especially) when a firm is distressed. It is thus not surprising that courts do 
not in fact want to treat directors as fiduciaries for credztors: except m extreme cases. But this leaves us with the second puzzle: If directors are 
rarely treated as fiduciaries for creditors, why have the Delaware courts 
bothered to say so much about this, especially in their recent opinions? 
This Article explores these tw� puzzle�, a�d .ar;s�es that these �ases are best under�tood as examples of expresszve ;wigmg, exhortatzons to good 
beh�vzor. not necessarily tethered to meaningfuf instrumental consequences. 
It zdentifies four expressive themes in these decisions on, among other 
thin;ss, director discretion, the boundaries of acceptable conduct towards 
cretf!.tors, the role of contract, and the educative function of courts. Tile 
Arhcle concludes lnt noting several doctrinal gaps created by some of the 
recent case law, and suggests ways that the better expressive aspzratzons of 
the Delaware opinions can fill these gaps in fair and efficient ways. 
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (2007); Professor 
of Law, James�· Beasley- Temple University School of Law. This article has benef1t�d frc:m 
comments rec�IVed at conferences and workshops at the University of Maryland, Umvers1t_y 
of Pennsylvarua, and Temple Law Schools. A discussion of the ideas presented in th1s arttcle IS 
slated t? appear. �n a symposium issue of the Journal of Business and Technology Law. See 
SymP?smm, Twzlzght m the Zone of Insolvency, J. Bus. TECH. L. (forthcoming). It has also benefited from the comments of, or discussions with, Matthew Adler, Douglas Baird, Jane Baron, Jeff Dunoff, Robert Lawless, Richard McAdams, Kathleen Noonan, Robert Rasmussen, �d;,ar� R. R�k, and The H.onorable Leo E. Strine, Jr. Dana Eddis, Noa Kaumeheiwa
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Introduction 
Our thinking about corporate financial distress has undergone a profound 
change in the nearly thirty years since the current Bankruptcy Code was enacted.1 
Whereas business failure was once largely a subspecies of procedural or remedial 
law, imbued with only modest and sporadic theoretical insights, it has today become 
a subject of enormous sophistication, both for practitioners and academics. Vigorous 
debates about policy, theory and methodology abound.2 
Perhaps the most important, if subtle, change in thinking about business 
distress has been to see that it is largely a problem of corporate govemance.3 Writers 
representing a variety of theoretical and political camps-from contractarians to 
empiricists- now recognize that corporate reorganization is not simply about the 
distribution of property; it is about human beings, and how law can set incentives to 
minimize the likelihood of, or damage from, corporate failure. Because corporate 
governance, like the more general field of agency from which it springs, is largely 
about incentives, the convergence between bankruptcy and corporate law is, in 
retrospect, no great surprise. 
How odd, then, that even as our thinking about corporate reorganization 
and corporate law converges, we have not yet figured out how to address that body 
of doctrine which is arguably at the heart of corporate governance problems and 
which is increasingly important to discussions about corporate financial distress: 
directors' fiduciary duties. 
Conventional wisdom teaches that, when a firm is solvent, corporate 
directors have no fiduciary obligations to corporate creditors. Directors manage the 
firm for the benefit of the firm's residual claimants who, on a standard model of 
priority, will be the common shareholders. When the corporation encounters 
financial trouble, however, courts frequently say-although rarely hold- that 
1 11 Usc §§ 101-1330 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Originally enacted in 1978, (Bankruptcy Reform Act of ·No�. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)), th_e Bankruptcy Code recently underwent a significant revision. Bankruptcy Abuse Preven�?n and Consum�r Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. (cod1fi� as amen�ed m s�attered sections of ll, 18 & 28 U.S.C.). The revision should have httle beanng on the Issues dtscussed in this Article. . . . 
• 2 Much of the literature reflecting this transformation, and the ensumg debates, 1s ated in Part I.A., infra. . . 
3 E 1 d" · thi d goes in no particular order, to Professors LoPuck1, ar y ere 1t m s regar ' . G · th Whitford, and Skeel. See L M. LoPucki & William C. yY11 tford, Corporate overnan
ce m � 
Bankruptcy Rear anization �rge, Publicly Held Corporatwns, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993), David A Sk 1 
g
J R th · k · the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bank
ruptcy, 72 TEX. 
L ee , r., e m zng ·REv. 471 (1994) 
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directors owe fiduciary duties of some sort to or for the benefit of corporate 
creditors.4 
Directors' duties to creditors present at least two puzzles. First, courts that 
talk about them make a strong, if problematic, link between duty and priority in 
right of payment, suggesting that directors should treat creditors as if they were 
shareholders, at least for certain purposes.s "By definition," Vice Chancellor Leo 
Strine observed in the recent and important decision in Production Resources, "the fact 
of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the 
shareholders-that of residual risk bearers."6 This link between priority and duty 
sounds good because it captures a strong intuition we have about the "absolute" 
nature of priority: creditors first, then shareholders.? 
But it is nevertheless curious. While it may make theoretical sense to say that 
directors owe duties to residual claimants when a firm is solvent, there is no 
apparent reason why this logic applies to most creditors. After alL creditors are 
usually protected by legal rights-contract, for example-in ways that shareholders 
are not. Moreover, the increasingly contractual nature of priority renders it both less 
absolute and less helpful in identifying the "residual" claimant when a firm is 
distressed. Most of us would say that this is not necessarily a problem, to the extent 
that creditors are parties to well-formed contracts. Why should duty be asked to do 
the work of contract? 
4_ Whil
_
e there a�e hundreds of opirtions, from Delaware and beyond, that say this, few actually find d1rectors liable, or even permit creditors to make much procedural progress. See 
also discussion at Part I. C. 
5 This is a point I first made in Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors' Duties to Creditors: Pow� Imbalan�e and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003) [heremafter, Drrectors' Duties]. 
6 Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004). . 
7 As the Supreme Court said in the Louisville Trust case "the stockholder's interest m thectroperty is subordinate to the rights of creditors. First of se�red and then of unsecured, 
ere itors.". Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 \1899)- I discuss the so-called "absolute priority rule" often associated with the Loursvrlle case m Part ll.A.2, infra. 
• 
• 
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It is thus no surprise that �ere is less here doctrinally than meets the eye.s 
Courts 
_
do not w�t to take senously the logical implications of the priority 
�oundations �n wh1ch th_
ey have built their duties-to-creditors model. To do so might 
Impose on directors duties of oversight, candor and value maximization that would 
be inappropriate to expect ex ante and troubling to remedy ex post. Courts have thus 
gone to great len�ths to contain the inexorable logic of the priority-duty model they 
have created. This has led some observers to suggest that directors' duties to 
creditors are "much ado about little."9 
But this leads to a second puzzle: If priority has little to do with duty, and 
creditors are usually able to protect themselves contractually, why have the courts­
in particular the Delaware Court of Chancery, "this nation's arguably most 
Important business court"1D- bothered to write such lengthy, elaborate, if 
occasionally confusing, opinions on directors' duties to creditors?11 Discussions of 
8 A word about the word "doctrine." This is a term used so frequently that it, like 
many terms of art, has an assumed identity. I do not use the term in an especially fancy way. 
Black's definition is as good as any: "A rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law." BLACK'S 
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). See also Wikipedia, Doctrine, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrine (defining doctrine as "from Latin doctrina (compare 
doctor), [doctrine] means 'a code of beliefs', 'a body of teachings' or 'instructions', taught 
principles or positions, as the body of teachings in a branch of knowledge or belief system"). 
To the extent that "doctrine" embodies "holdings" from cases, a more sophisticated 
approach would contrast doctrine and "dicta." A recent attempt to do that yields the 
following definition: "A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional 
path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of �he 
case, and (3) lead to the judgment." See Michael Abramo"':ICZ &; Maxwell Steams,_ Defi_nzng Dzcta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2005). One could quibble WJth this along the followmg !me�: 
What Is a "proposition"? What made the judge choose the deasJOnal path tak�n? �hat does 1t mean for a proposition to "lead" to a judgment? But such qmbbles take us me_v�tably ?own the path to indeterminacy. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indetermmacy Cnszs: Cntlquzng C
({
�tical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL L. REV. 283 
89) . 
. . 9 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much A� About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the VzC!mty of Insolvency, ]. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcommg), http://ssm.com/abstrac�832504. . • . 10 Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is I:a_wful, Presumably there are Circumstances m 
Winch zt 1s Equitable to Take that Action: The Impl!Clt Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chns-Craft, 60 Bus. LAW. 877, 878 (2005). 11 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at .. 108-09 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); P_rod. �es. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004); Trenwick Am. Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young LL.P., 906 A.2d 168 (2006); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Pr?g. Found., �nc. v. Gheewalla, 2006 WL 2588971, at .. 11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2oo6). As this Article was gomg to pr�ss, the Dela�are Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the Delaware Chancery Court m Gheewalla. N. Am CathoJ1·c Ed p . F und Inc v Rob Gheewalla, A.2d--' 2007 WL 1453705 · uc. rogrammmg o ., · · , . - h (Del. May 18 2007) Thi th Delaware Supreme Court s first real pronouncement on t e subject. Alth�u h it wa: :c::s s�ible to rewrite the entire Article to acc?unt for the Supreme Court's Gheew lgl · . thpod _ t rs of the Staniford Journal of Law, Busmess and Fmance were k" a a oprmon, e e 1 o d" ·t md enough to allow me to add a postscript at the end that Jscusses I . 
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duty often exhibit a large gap between rhetoric and reality.12 This gap seems 
especially large in Delaware courts' discussions about directors' duties to creditors. 
What accounts for all the talk about directors' duties to creditors? 
While we can never fully know why judges write the opinions they write, 
one explanation of these cases is that they are expressive forms of adjudication. 
Although there is no precise definition of "expressive law," the general idea-and 
the one used here-is that law, whether statute or judicial opinion, can express 
values and affect social norms independent of the actual consequences of the law's 
application.B This seems especially important when law is in flux. Thus, even if 
Delaware courts are in fact unwilling to act on the implications of the conceptual 
model they have chosen, they nevertheless wish to use these cases as an opportunity 
to explore the changing boundaries of directorial behavior when a firm is in distress. 
The Delaware cases on directors' duties to creditors are expressive and experimental 
attempts to generate norms and standards that guide directorial behavior in this 
context. 
To date, no one has recognized the expressive function of judicial rhetoric 
about the priority-duty model and directors' duties to creditors.14 This article fills 
that gap and describes four important expressive themes in recent Delaware case law 
• 
12 Melvin Eisenberg, among others, has famously observed that there is a big 
d1ff_erence between the standard of care implied by fiduciary doctrine and the standard of 
r�v1ew by which courts will scrutinize the discharge of those duties. See, e.g., Melvin Aron 
E1senberg, The Dzvergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
13 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 585, 586 
p998) ("Accord�g to the expressive theory of law, the expression of social values is �� 
1mportant �nction of the courts or, possibly, the most important function of courts. ) 
(footnote omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2022 (1996) ("Many people support law because of the statements made by law, and 
disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law."). Richard 
�cAdams has perhaps developed the fullest account of the expressive function of law. See 
Rich�rd H. Mc�dams: The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043 (2005) 
[heremafter Adjudzcatzon ]; see also Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The 
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the �xpressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. 
& ECON. REv. 1 (2003); Tom Gmsbu_rg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: A� 
E�presszve Theory of Intenzatzonal Dzspute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004), 
Rich�rd H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1684 (2000) 
[heremafter Focal Point]; �chard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive �aw, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 339,369 (2000); �chard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Poznt Theory of 
Legal Compllance: Expresszve Influence in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STIJD. 8_7 (2005). Although, as discussed in Part III, infra the idea that law performs an 
�xpressi_ve function is not new, its current locus is oft�n said to be Lawrence Lessig's 
mflu�ntial artic_
le, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1009-12 (1995) 
[heremafter Soczal Meaning]. 
14 One �rticle mentions this in passing, and then only by implication. See Alon Chaver 
& Jesse M. Fn�d, Managers' Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for 
Performance Credztors, 55 V AND. L. REV. 1813, 1815 & n.7 (2002). 
"" 
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on directors' duties to creditors: (i) Directors should have broad discretion to act for 
the firm, even when the firm is distressed, so long as they have taken account of 
creditors' interests in some general sense; (ii) Courts will use narratives of extreme 
behavior to help generate norms and values that should govern directorial behavior 
when a firm is distressed; (iii) Contract can and should increasingly determine 
creditor protections; and (iv) Non bankruptcy courts- in particular the Delaware 
courts- will have an important educative role in framing discussions about relations 
between corporate directors, debtors and creditors. 
Doctrinal and expressive questions regarding directors' duties to creditors 
have potentially enormous consequences. The recent, massive increase in borrowing 
to finance corporate acquisitions and the p ayment of dividends and fees to the 
private equity firms that buy these corporations portend serious disputes over both 
priority and directors' duties to corporate creditors.1s Increasingly complex financial 
structures (securitizations) frequently depend for their effectiveness on the 
appointment of "independent" directors.16 Without a better understanding of what 
the Delaware courts are trying to tell us, we will have increasing difficulty advising 
corporate directors and creditors ex ante and resolving their disputes ex post. 
This Article proceeds in four major parts. Part I describes the three major 
stages in the development of case law involving directors' duties to creditors, 
emphasizing Delaware's very recent attempts to rein in the doctrinal implications of 
the priority-duty model on which its jurisprudence rests. Part II develops the two 
major puzzles created by the cases: probleJns with priority and the marginal doctrinal 
relevance of these cases. Part III develops an expressive explanation of these cases. Part 
N explores some of the doctrinal gaps left by existing law, especially as to non­
contractual creditors and how the expressive features of these decisions create 
opportunities to fill those gaps in fair and efficient ways. 
I. The Three Eras of Directors' Duties to Creditors 
Courts, especially Delaware courts, and commentators routine!� say that once 
a firm is seriously distressed directors become fiduciaries for the benefit of corporate 
creditors.17 Although credit;rs rarely recover on claims for breaches of such duties,18 
1s As discussed below, there is growing evidence that private equity firms that buy 
corporation s  increasingly cause the corporations to borrow money that IS then used to pay 
dividends or exorbitant fees to the owners. See discussions, Parts LB. & III.B.3, belo"':. I& Th C Bankr and Corp. Reorg. of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structur�d 7;�a��i�n Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527,556 �1995) (explainin& that "[w]here[a 
spect.al pu f" · g b ·d· · ry]1·5 owmed b" the orwmator (or an affiliate), the [speoal rpose manon su s1 ta J q· · d " purpose entity] rna be structured so that (a) one or more d1�ectors ar� mdept;n ent., ). . 17 Alth 
y
h f .1. t gruz· e the largely expresstve function of d1rectors duties to oug a1 mg o reco 
d d" · h" bl 5 creditors b d f l"terature has develope 1scussmg t IS pro em. ee, e.g., , an enormous o y o I · " A U E · .r th Christoph L B t H lth d the "Insolvency Exceptzon : n nnecessary xpanswn O; e er . arne t, ea co an d F"d · D 1· - .r 011+; Doctrine? 16 B D J 441 465 (2000); Roy ce de R. Baron es, 1 uczary u Ie, O; ;;•cers , ANKR. EV. . , 
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to have the bankruptcy case dismissed, MGM's controlling shareholder, Giancarlo 
Parretti entered into a restructuring agreement with the bank whereby he ceded 
most of his power as shareholder to CLBN. 30 Despite the restructuring agreement, it 
appears that Parretti persisted in attempting to control MGM. 31 Believing that 
Parretti was in breach of the restructuring agreement, CLBN exercised its right to 
take control of Parretti's stock. It then voted the stock to remove Parretti and his 
designees from the board and to replace them with directors selected by CLBN, led 
by Alan Ladd]2 CLBN then asked the Delaware Chancery Court to confirm its 
appointments and enforce the restructuring agreement. 33 
Parretti asserted a variety of counterclaims against CLBN, including two 
alleging that CLBN and Ladd had breached duties to Parretti by creating "golden 
parachutes" for the bank-appointed directors and refusing to sell certain assets.34 
Chancellor Allen summarily disposed of the claims. "It is," he observed "an oddity of 
these facts that the change in control that the contracts contemplated is one that would 
return control back to an existing controlling shareholder, but I don't see that 
circumstance as necessarily material."35 There was, according to Chancellor Allen, no 
basis for claiming the breach of any duty to Parretti as there was "persuasive evidence 
that the Ladd management group acted prudently with respect to these transactions 
from the point of view of MGM."36 
If Chancellor Allen had said no more than this, Credit Lyonnais would 
probably not have been a terribly important or controversial decision. Parretti had, 
after all, ceded control to CLBN under the restructuring agreement. Howev�r, 
Chancellor Allen went on to announce what appears to have been a new, and ill-
;::<> Sec Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at "7-"8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The court viewed the transacbon as 
"typical" of the profligate nature of LBOs occurring at the end of the 1980s. "It was ve� 
highly leveraged ... and the price appears to have been high. In another respe_
ct, howev,;r,/
�
. was not typical (in that] it involved a private sale to a person not assoCiated with MGM. 
at •8. 
'0 Sec id. at "33 (discussing bank's control under restructuring agreement). A!thou� 
Parretti retained the right to appoint three of the five members of MGM'� board of di�ct�� 
the board's power was significantly diminished because the restructu�ng agreemen cutive created an executive committee, which was controlled by the bank's appomtee. ;J.:e ��aware committee was to have all of the powers and the duties permissib�e under e G� /d. at General Corporation Law and in most respects to act as the board of directors forM · 
"36 n.22. 
31 See id. at "35-"70. 
32 See id. at "70. 
" See id. at "3. 
hich was J.l See id. at "97-"98. Technically, Parretti claimed that the duty ran to PCC �e owner the 98.5 percent shareholder of MGM. Since Parretti controlled PCC, I Will refer to 
of MGM's shares as Parretti. 
35 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at "107. 
36 /d. at .. 1 08. 
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defined, set of duties owed by directors to or for the benefit of corporate creditors: 
"At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of 
directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise." 3 7 
2. Chancellor Allen's Hypothetical 
To illustrate how duty under these circumstances might work, Chancellor 
Allen offered a lengthy discussion of the presumed incentives directors might have, 
depending on a corporation's financial condition. The bulk of the analysis appeared in 
a footnote in the form of a hypothetical designed to show that "[t]he possibility of 
insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of 
opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors."38 The hypothetical 
assumed a corporation with a single asset-a significant judgment, on appeal, 
against a solvent corporation. The corporate plaintiff had only a single class of 
creditors: bondholders owed $12 million.39 Chancellor Allen then suggested three 
possible outcomes with varying degrees of likelihood: (i) 25% chance of affirmance, 
(ii) 70% chance of modification, and (iii) 5% chance of reversal.40 After discounting for 
these possible outcomes, he suggests that the board would assume that the current 
value of the judgment was $15.55 million.41 This would leave equity of around $3.55 
million after satisfaction of the $12-million claims of the bondholders.42 
The problem posed in the hypothetical was this: What sort of settlement offer 
should the directors accept, and on what basis? A settlement offer of $12.5 million or 
$17.5 million would, Chancellor Allen surmised, be rejected by a board that viewed 
itself as solely bound to act on behalf of shareholders because shareholders would 
view any offer of less than $21.75 million as inadequate.43 Chanceiior Ailen suggested 
37 Id. at *108 (footnotes omitted). In using the term "�esidue risk bearer," Chancellor 
All
_en invoked the language and construct of priority, a subject treated m
 Pa�. 
Il.A. _ below. 
Strictly speaking, Chancellor Allen could not have treated CLBN (or,
any_ of �G� s creditors) as 
su<;h because the company was not yet insolvent. Bemg only m !he ':'IO�Ity of msolvency� the 
residual risk bearer on a standard theory of priority �ould be :ItherJUTII?r. unsecured :redit�Hs or Pan:;tti (through his holding company, PCC). �e mdetermmacy Imphot m t�e constructiOn of this zone" of insolvency is one of several frustrating features of Crcdrt Lyormarb. 
38 I d. at *108 n.55. 
39 Id. at *108. 
4D Id. 
4t Id. 
uw . 
43 Jd. at *108 n.SS. Chancellor Allen came to th,�����rm_ise b�sed on
 the_ dis
co�nted 
values of the various possible outcomes of the appeal: 11 1ne ht1gat10n. alternative,. with Its 25% probability of a $39 million outcome to [the sh�reholders] ($51 milhon- $12 milhon [=] $3� million) has an expected value to the residual nsk bearer o_f �9.75 milhon ($39 milhon x 25 Yo chance of affirmance), substantially greater than the $5.5 m1lhon available to them m the settlement." I d. at *108 n.55. 
I I 
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that directors should reject both extremes and take the middle course.44 This result, 
he observed, would require: 
[D]irectors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal 
and economic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing 
the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of 
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient 
and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from 
the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or 
any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given 
the opportunity to act.4S 
Credit Lyonnais was widely viewed as a controversial case, for at least two 
reasons. First, some read it to create a sword for plaintiffs who might sue corporate 
directors.46 This interpretation appealed to the bankruptcy bar (or at least those who 
often represent bankruptcy trustees or creditors' committees) as it suggested a basis for 
recovery, and thus a new source of work. 
Second, no one quite knew when these duties (and the risks they entail) would 
attach. Real insolvency is difficult enough to identify with any precision ex ante in a 
going concem.47 Anticipating it seems a very tall order. If one uses a convention�! 
definition of insolvency- based on net book assets at fair value- many firms are m 
the "vicinity" of insolvency. Highly leveraged transactions- going private with debt 
Although he did not cite the case, Chancellor Allen was postulating a solution to the 
problem presented in In re Central Ice Cream Co., 59 B.R. 476, 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, �2 
B.R. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1986), where the debtor's sole asset was a verdict against McDonald s 
Corporation for $52 million. Before McDonald's motion for judgment notwithstandmg the verdict was decided, McDonald's offered $15.5 million in settlement. ld. at 482�83. Tha� 
amount was sufficient to pay creditors in full but left the estate with only $1 m1llion t� $ 
million, the bulk of which probably would ha�e been applied to expenses of admirustrah��· 
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement over the objection of shareholders. Id. at 4 
· 
See also In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1076 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding 1cr;� 
co�r.t's finding .and awarding reasonable attorneys' fees as damages ); Lyrm M. LoPucblicl W1lham C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorgamzatwll of Large, Pu ) Y 
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669,784 n.368 (1993) (discussing the Central Ice Cream �as�s 
� Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 ("[O)ne should mlS 55 h�pothehcal accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than $ · million, and one below that amount should be rejected."). 
45 Id. . . uld be 40 See, e .. g., Barondes, supra note 17, at 66-71 (arguing that Credzt Lymwazs . sho of read to create nghts that are "affirmatively enforceable" by creditors agamst directors ·71
C · • h · · · · F"d · ry Duties I o.mpames m t e .v1oruty of msolvency); see also Royce de R. Barondes, z . ucz
a 
Distressed Corporatwns: Second Generation Issues,]. Bus. TECH. L. REV. (forthcommg 20°7)· ld s 
• 47 See Director:s' Duties, supra note 5, at 1212; see also Douglas G. Baird & Do��E L.J: Bemstem, Absolute Pn�rzt_y, Val�ati?n �ncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargam, 115 Y.se and 1930, 194�-44 (2�) ( D1spanties m mvestors' views over how to value the enterpn. tion how the JUdge Will value it drive much of the bargaining in large business reorgaruza cases."). 
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assumed b y  the target-could easily have this effect. This notion of the "zone" of 
insolvency has intrigued commentators, even though it is not a subject that lawyers are 
especially well equipped to analyze and even though it is not, in my estimation, a 
useful analytic category.4B 
As with the trust fund cases, central to the logic of Credit Lyonnais is the link 
between duty and priority. Duties shift away from shareholders, on Chancellor Allen's 
analysis, when the firm enters a pre-insolvency zone of distress, a time when, like 
Schrodinger' s cat, residual claimant status might flicker between shareholders and 
creditors.49 Credit Lyonnais may mean that directors have no duties to any particular 
constituency when it becomes practically impossible to identify a residual claimant. 
Yet, this shift can occur in the first place only if solvency on a standard model of 
priority influences the existence and vector of duty. 
3. The Doctrinal Implications of Credit Lyonnais 
While Credit Lyonnais was an important decision, very few of us stopped to 
consider the full doctrinal implications of its priority-based logic. What might Credit 
Lyonnais really mean? If the case really meant that directors owed duties to creditors 
once a firm entered the "vicinity" of insolvency, it created some potentially serious 
problems. Consider a few: 
• Candor. Cases like Malone v. Bri11catSO hold that when directors of solvent 
corporations communicate with shareholders, they have a duty of candor. 
While Malone was not the law in 1991, its predecessors-in particular 
Lynch5l- would also have imposed important disclosure obligations on 
directors. Would these duties of candor shift to creditors even before 
insolvency? If so, how would corporations ever effectively engage in the 
workout negotiations that frequently take place between creditors and the 
corporation when the company is distressed?52 
48 See Directors' Duties, note 5, at 1212. . . . 
49 This famous thought experiment posited_ that u!"certamhes m quantum_ the<?ry suggested that a cat placed in a sealed en�ironment with a pmson gas tnggered by rad10achve decay could be alive or dead at the same time. . . 0 0 . , • .  
See Schrodinger' 5 cat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr YoC3 YoB6dmger s_cat (viSited 
8/6/06). 
' 
50 722 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. 1998). 7) (h ld' h · s1 See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 197 . . o mg t at m 
�aking a tender offer to acquire the stock of the minority stoc�old_ers, a_ maJority ,stockholder owed a fiduciary duty . . . which required 'complete can?or m disclos1�g fully all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 'tender offer."') (quoting Lynch v. VIckers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 573 (Del. Ch. 1976)). · 
s2 Alth h · 1 · omewhat different facts the Delaware Chancery court held m oug mvo vmg s ' . · · h · the Bren case that failures of disclosure to creditors of an m�olvent hm1ted partners 1p may breach fiduciary duties. See Bren v. Capital Realty Group Semor Hous., Inc., 2004 WL 370214, 
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• Monitoring. Directors are generally said to have "a duty to inform 
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them,"53 an obligation which the Caremark court said 
required some form of regularized monitoring mechanism.54 The Delaware 
Supreme Court recently endorsed this standard in Stone v. Ritter.55 Yet, as 
with a duty of candor, should the duties suggested by Caremark and Ritter 
apply with equal force to or for the benefit of corporate creditors, even 
before the firm is insolvent? The idea that directors might have duties to 
monitor in anticipation of insolvency could have real punch for creditors 
since many failures will, in hindsight, have been predictable had there been 
proper monitoring. 
• Final Period Duties. Perhaps the greatest problem posed by Credit Lyonnais 
would involve the special duties of directors when a firm engages in a final 
period transaction. In the classic cases- Revlon56 and Van Gorkom57- the 
inference is that directors should maximize firm value when a change of 
control is inevitable. But, if bankruptcy also typically results in a change in 
control (from shareholders to creditors), and a transaction that places the 
firm in the zone of insolvency is the first step toward bankruptcy, what are 
directors to do? Maximize value for shareholders, risking liability to 
creditors? Or take a more conservative approach that might protect 
creditors, but may also shortchange shareholders?SB 
at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2004) ("At this preliminary stage, the Court cannot hold that there is no 
set of fa�s that coul� be proven ... that would entitle [plaintiff] to relief. Defendants only 
weakly d1sp�te Bren s �ssertion that the General Partner owed a duty of full disclosure to the Noteholders m connectlon with the requested consents."). 
:Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984). 
. . S�e In re C�remark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1�
96) 
(statu:g � dt�a that dt�ectors may be liable "for a breach of the duty to exercise appropna�e attention which may mclude "an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances J1l 
which du� attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss"). . . 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006)("We hold that Carenwrk articulates the necessary 
�ondltions predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to Implement any reporting or information system or controls or (b) having implemented such a system or controls co · 1 f ·1 d · ' " 56 , nsaous Y ate to morutor or oversee its operations . . . . ). 
1986). 
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175-76 (D
el. 
: �: S�ith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). e 
Court t 
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Given these potential problems created by Credit Lyonnais, it is not 
surpr�sing
. 
tha� th� Delaware courts have been reluctant to follow through on its 
doctnnal Implications. Yet, the Delaware courts remain unwilling to jettison the 
rhetoric of the priority-duty model, frequently stating that directors owe duties to 
creditors because creditors step into the "shoes" of shareholders when the finn is 
distressed. In this third and most recent stage in the development of directors' duties 
to creditors, the priority-duty model seems to work as a one-way ratchet. It justifies 
dismissing creditors' claims with the same sorts of procedural devices used to 
eliminate shareholder claims when a finn is solvent - the business judgment rule or 
exculpatory charter clauses - but apparently provides creditors few, if any, 
correlative protections. 
1. Production Resources 
The first of these third-generation opinions is Production Resources, which was 
essentially a protracted collection matter that happened to land in Delaware Chancery 
Court. 59 The plaintiff, creditor Productions Resources Group (PRG), grew exasperated 
with the evasiveness of the debtor, defendant NCT Group (NCT), a Delaware 
corporation, and sought the appointment of a receiver for NCf under DCCL § 291 
and damages for breaches of fiduciary duty by NCT's directors.60 
Although he declined to appoint a receiver,61 Vice Chancellor Strine did use 
this case as an opportunity to dilate on the scope and nature of directors' duties to 
creditors. He began by expressing doubt that "there is a magic dividing line that 
should signal the end to some, most, or all risk-taking on behalf of stockholders or 
even on behalf of creditors, who are not homogenous and whose interests may not 
be served by a board that refuses to undertake any further business activities that 
involve risk."62 Strine consequently rejected Credit Lyonnais to the extent that it 
contemplates that creditors of a corporation in the "zone of insolvency" may assert 
risky final-period transactions. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). See also part II.B.2, infra. 
59 Prod.  Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCf Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
60 Jd. at 775, 777-78. See also Second Amended and Verified Complaint, Prod. Res. G�ou p v. Ncr, Group, Inc., C.A. No. 1 14-N, p. 13 '! (b) (filed Mar. 22, 2004, Del. Ch.) [heremafter, Production Resources Complaint]. · · 
h 
61 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 291 provides: "Whenever a corporation shall be msolvent, t: .e Court of Chancery, on the application of any cred1tor or stockholde� thereof,,may at any hme, appoint 1 or more persons to be receivers of and for .the corporation ·, 
. ·. . _D�L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (2007). Although PRG adequately pleaded msolvency (�CT s hab1ht1es w�re 
nearly five times its assets and it could not borrow from anyone), VICe Chancellor Stnne declined to appoint a receiver, as this was a motion to dismiss. Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 783. 
62 Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 788 n. 52. 
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claims against directors for breaches of fiduciary duty.63 Instead, he found the 
"spirit" of Credit Lyonnais was that the business-judgment rule protected directors 
acting in good faith, who pursue a less risky business strategy in the light of 
potential insolvency because the directors fear a riskier strategy would cause the 
corporation to default on its legal obligations to creditors.64 
Vice Chancellor Strine explicitly embraced the priority-duty model: "By 
definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied 
by the shareholders - that of residual risk bearers."65 And, the Vice Chancellor did 
not merely talk the talk; he also walked the walk, treating the creditor, PRG, as if it 
were asserting shareholder claims, at least for certain purposes. 
First, he found that even if directors had duties to creditors in the zone of 
insolvency, creditors did not necessarily have standing to assert breach of fiduciary 
duty claims.66 Strine reasoned that many of their claims should be treated as 
derivative claims, just as though they had been asserted by shareholders. 
"[R]egardless of whether they are brought by creditors when a company is 
insolvent," Vice Chancellor Strine observed, " these claims remain derivative, with 
either shareholders or creditors suing to recover for a harm done to the corporation 
as an economic entity and any recovery logically flows to the corporation and 
benefits the derivative plaintiffs indirectly to the extent of their claim on the firm's 
assets."67 Although the opinion is opaque on which claims would have been 
derivative for this purpose, and fails to explain how creditors could possibly jump 
the unusual procedural hurdles that typically bar derivative actions,68 Vice 
Chancellor Strine nevertheless thinks that creditors of the insolvent corporation are 
to be treated as if they were shareholders for purposes of asserting derivative claims. 
Second, he held that the exculpatory clause in NCT s charter would protect 
the directors, just as it would have protected them if shareholders had made the 
sa�e claimS.69 Although OCCL § 102(b)(7) fails to mention creditors specifically, 
Strine reasoned that the statute's " plain terms" applied to claims belonging to the 
corporation.70 Therefore, the derivative claims asserted by the plaintiffs fell within 
63 Id. at 789-90. 
64 Id. at 787. 
65 Id. at 791. 
66 Id. at 789 n.54. 
67 I d. at 792. 
Vi 
68 Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 892 (Del . Ch. 2004)-_The 
d. ce C�ancellor appears to have been peeved that the parties had "not burdened" him Wlth a tscuss
d
t?n of _Rule 23:1, which requires shareholders to make demand on the board b
efore 
procee 1�g wtth a denvative suit. Id. at 796. 
personal li p�?�· Res., 
8�,A.2d at �93. Corporate charter provisions that insulate directors fro� 
authorized
a
b
t 0ty toC
the corporation or its stockholders" for breaches of the duty of care ar 70 Y EL. . ODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). . Id. As discussed in Part IV B . , ;.. I . . . hink this ts a fair reading of sectio 1 02(b)(7) 
· ., ml'_ a, question th1s analysts. I do not t n or sound pohcy. 
* 
• 
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the scope of the exculpatory provision.?! Strine reasoned the purpose of § 102(b)(7) 
was to encourage capable persons to serve as directors "by providing them with the 
freedom to make risky, good faith business decisions without fear of personal 
liability."72 There is, he wrote, a " real danger" that a fact-finder, when evaluating 
evidence that the directors' business strategy failed, would be biased by hindsight 
and therefore would incorrectly conclude the directors breached the duty of care.73 
Despite these concerns, Vice Chancellor Strine held that in extraordinary 
circumstances, creditors might be able to assert direct claims against directors: 
I will resolve the motion on the established principle that when a 
firm is insolvent, the directors take on a fiduciary relationship to the 
company's creditors, combining that principle with the conservative 
assumption that there might, possibly exist circumstances in which 
the directors display such a marked degree of animus towards a 
particular creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they 
expose themselves to a direct fiduciary duty claim by that creditor.74 
The Vice Chancellor said that in rendering this decision he was not "making 
any broad pronouncements that would have large policy implications."75 This was 
undoubtedly motivated by the many vexing problems that would be presented if he 
really did treat NCT's directors as fiduciaries for PRG, perhaps the most important 
of which would involve the double-bind of having to act as fiduciary toward a 
litigating adversary: 
I want to make clear what this opinion does not conclude. I do not rest my 
decision in any manner on the proposition that it is a breach of fiduciary 
duty for the board of an insolvent company to engage iri vigorous, good­
faith negotiations with a judgment creditor. That, in fact, might be the duty 
of a board, which necessarily has to balance the interests of all those with a 
claim to the firm's iriadequate assets.76 
71 Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 793. 
72 Id. 
73 ld. at 794. 
74 ld. at 798. . . 
75 Jd. Strine appeared to have been ambiv�lent about the novelty and diffl�lty of the 
problems presented by directors' duties to creditors
. On �e one han_d, he claimed t_hat . [e]valuati...'1g a creditor's claim that directors have breached fiduC_Jary duties owe� t� the f�rm 
mv?lves no novel inquiry, as the court can �raw deeply on �e Pn.:'Cipies tha_
t app1y,m �p1c
al 
denvative cases." ld. at 801. Yet, he also claJmed that the bas1c attnbutes of di�ectors, duties to creditors-e.g., what obligations directors would owe to corporate creditors- are very Important in this context for obvious reasons." Id. at 797. 
76 Id. at 800 . 
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Vice Chancellor Strine continued to explore the nature of directors' duties to 
creditors- and to rein in Credit Lyonnais -in the recent Trenwick America decisionJ7 
The Trenwick litigation arose from the bankruptcy of Trenwick America Corporation 
(Trenwick America), wl-Jch was the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of the Bermuda­
based insurance-holding company, Trenwick Group, Inc. (Trenwick Parent)? 8  
Trenwick America's plan of reorganization created the plaintiff, Trenwick America 
Litigation Trust (the Litigation Trust), which obtained, among other things, all of 
Trenwick America's claims, as well as "derivative creditor and shareholder 
claims."79 
The Litigation Trust asserted a host of claims against, among others, the 
directors of Trenwick Parent and Trenwick America, and the Trenwick Parent's 
accountants, Ernst & Young, for, among other things, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty 
and deepening insolvency. These claims arose from a series of acquisitions and 
restructurings undertaken by the Trenwick entities and affiliates beginning in 1998, 
and apparently completed in 2000 (three years before the bankruptcy cases were 
cornmenced).80 At the completion of these transactions, these entities were 
apparently solvent.Bl 
Using a variety of well-established procedural tools, Vice Chancellor Strine 
dispatched the Litigation Trust's complaint entirely . First, Strine observed that the 
Litigation Trust had no standing to pursue any direct claims of Trenwick America 
creditors because none were assigned to the Litigation Trust under Trenwick 
America's plan of reorganization or otherwise.s2 Second, he noted that even if the 
Litiga�on Trust had �erivative claims, those were exclusively claims of Trenwic� 
Amenca - n�t Trenw1ck Parent.83 Under "settled principles of Delaware Ia�, 
however, Strine noted that "a parent corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to Its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries or their creditors."84 Moreover, i f  the directors had, and 
breached, any fiduciary duties, they would have run to Trenwick Parent -not 
. . n Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young LLP, 906 A.2d 1 68 (2006). As of this wnting, �en
1d
wick is on appeal. Appeal docketed, No. 495 (Del. Sept. 14, 2006) . . at 1 75 . 
. 79 !d. at 189-90 (quoting Trenwick Am. Corp. Second Amended Plan of Reorgaru;ation § 1.16 (emphasis omitted)). Id. at 1 72. 
81 Id. 
L'ti ti 
82 �d. at 190-91. Nor, he added, could such claims ever have been asserted by the 
1 
d
ga on .. rust, even if assigned to it, since bankruptcy trustees or litigation trusts created un er coruurned plans of · · c' · · � "  
bel · 
reorgaruzation can apparently never have standing to pursue tauw 
M'�
ng�gG
exclusively to creditors. Id. at 1 91 (discussing, among others Caplin v. Mar
ine 
Tr�:Ck a:��
e C�., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), which so held). The constructio; of standing under 
83 
T 
ert�m other cases creates a remedial gap which I discuss in Part IV.A, below. 
84 1J
enwick � .
. 
Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (2006) at 191-92· · at 191 (atations omitted). 
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Trenwick America. Thus, in the absence of grounds to pierce Trenwick Parent's 
corporate veil, the Litigation Trust simply could not assert claims of Trenwick 
America itself. Buttressing his view that the Litigation Trust could not recover from 
Trenwick Parent's directors were the business judgment rule as well as an 
exculpatory clause in Trenwick Parent's charter.ss Both applied with equal force to 
further undercut the Litigation Trust's position. 
Third, even though it was " in one respect, on firmer ground" than the other 
claims, Strine also disrrtissed the plaintiff's claim that Trenwick America' s directors 
breached duties owed to Trenwick America.86 This claim was stronger, Strine 
acknowledged, because there is little question that the directors owe duties to some 
extent to the corporate entity itself.B7 Here, however, the " context" in which 
Trenwick America's directors owed duties to Trenwick America effectively nullified 
the plaintiff's claim because Trenwick America was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Trenwick Parent. Delaware's Supreme Court has, Strine observed, " made clear that, 
'in a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context, directors of the subsidiary are 
obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests of the 
parent and its shareholders."'88 This "settled rule of law [was] of critical 
importance," Strine reasoned, because "the Trenwick America board had no duty to 
replicate the deliberative process of its sole stockholder's board of directors."89 
3. Gheewalla 
As of this writing, Delaware's most recent move to constrain the doctrinal 
implications of Credit Lyonnais appears in the Gheewalla case.90 In Gheewalla, the 
85 Id. at 192-195. 
86 ld. at 200. 
87 I d. (citations omitted). 
88 Id. (quoting Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E .  Corp., 545 A.2d 1 171, 1 174 
(Del. 1988) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
, 89 Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young LLP, 906 A.2d .1�8 (2006) at 200-01.
 
( There is no sound basis to hold that the boards of wholly-owned subsidianes must engage in �heir own parallel . . .  processes . . . .  "). This may be ano.ther ex�mpl� of reluct�nce to take senously the implications of the priority-duty model of d1:ectors duh.es to creditors. If the Trenwick America subsidiary were insolvent, an� we beheve� as Stnne and many others 
do-that insolvency effectively subrogates . creditor� to the nght
s of shareholders, then 
Trenwick America's creditors should have displaced 1ts shareholder, Trenw1ck Parent, as the 
residual claimant. If so, then presumably Trenwick America's directors would have had (and 
perhaps breached) duties to Trenwick America's creditors. 
90 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Rob . Ghe�walla, 200? WL 2588971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006). As discussed in note 1 1, above, when this Article was gomg to 
pre�s, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the Gheewalla Chancery Court 
decision. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programmmg Found., Inc. v. Ro� Gheewalla, .- A.2d � 
2007 WL 1453705 (Del. May 18, 2007). Although time would not permit a full re�nte of t�Is 
Article, there is a brief postscript, infra, discussing the Supreme Court deos10n and Its 
Implications for the observations made here. 
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plaintiff, North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. 
(NACEPF), held licenses to certain radio spectrum. NACEPF, along with certain 
other holders of similar spectrum licenses, entered into a " Master Use and Royalty 
Agreement" (Master Agreement) with Clearwire Holdings, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation (Clearwire). Under the somewhat complex terms of this agreement, it 
appears that Clearwire was to purchase from licensees, such as NACEPF, spectrum 
that they had sublicensed to companies such as Sprint and Worldcom, as the sub­
licenses expired.91 The ultimate goal was apparently to " 'develop the spectrum assets 
of [NACEPF and other license holders] into an operating, national system of wireless 
connections to the intemet."'<n 
According to the plaintiff, however, the defendants - who were three 
directors appointed by Clearwire' s principal investor, Goldman Sachs - had a 
'"hidden agenda . . .  to use the rights granted Clearwire in the Master Agreement to 
extract concessions from Sprint, Worldcom and other wireless operators."'93 
Whether or not Goldman actually had such a plan became moot in June of 2002, 
when Worldcom's accounting problems came to light, leading to speculation that 
there would soon be "a glut of available spectrum."94 Following the collapse of the 
spectrum market, Clearwire entered into negotiations with all of the parties to the 
Master Agreement and made a variety of payments to those parties to settle claims 
that they may have had against Clearwire.95 NACEPF, however, refused to settle. 
Without further financing from Goldman Sachs (or anyone else), Clearwire soon 
went out of business.% 
NACEPF claimed, among other things, that Clearwire "was either insolvent 
or in the 'zone of insolvency"' and therefore owed fiduciary duties to NACEPF, a 
'"substantial creditor."'97 NACEPF alleged the defendant directors breached 
fiduciary duties by: (i) failing to preserve Clearwire's assets for its benefit and the 
benefit of its creditors "when it became apparent that Clearwire would not be able to 
continue as a going concern and would need to be liquidated," and (ii) "holding on" 
to �AC�PF's spectrum rights even though it did not use them (i.e., by further 
sublicensmg them) "solely to keep Goldman Sachs's investment ' in play.
"'98 
. . 91 ld. at *3 ("�e 'business plan reflected in the terms of the Master Agr�ment' enVlsJon�d _that Clearw1re would exercise its power to obtain rights in [NACEPF's] . · · License
s 
as the eXJstin [ bl" ] · · · ht f f 
g ,su lce�ses · · · expued and current lessees [sic] failed to exercise the1r n
g_ 5 
0 �rs� refusal . ). (quotu;;g Co�plaint at 'li 21). Apparently, the Complaint (and the parbes) use t e !;rms �1censee . and 'lessee" interchangeably. !d. at n.33. ld. at 4 (quoting Complaint at '1 22). : ld. (quo�g Complaint at 'i 28). 
Id. (quoting Complaint at 1 34). 95 I d. at *5. 
% ld. 
: Id. (CJl!oting C_omplaint at '1 45). Id. at 5 (quoting Complaint at '1 45). 
I 
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Vice Chancellor Noble began his analysis by observing that he would be 
limited to the question whether a creditor could assert a direct - rather than a 
derivative - claim against directors of a Delaware corporation that was either 
insolvent, or in the vicinity if insolvency.99 At least part of the court's analysis turned 
on the fact that, for reasons not explained, NACEPF "waived any basis it may have 
had for pursuit of its claim derivatively."Jco It thus apparently sought only to assert 
direct claims against the directors. Defendants, not surprisingly, argued that this 
issue had not been resolved by Production Resources, and that Delaware courts should 
in fact recognize only derivative - not direct - creditor claims.1m 
Since the court accepted that Clearwire was seriously distressed,1o2 it 
addressed the standing question from both the zone-of-insolvency and insolvency 
perspectives. As to the former, the court relied on Delaware's recent Tooley decision, 
reasoning that the direct/ derivative distinction '"must be based solely on the 
following questions: Who suffered the alleged harm -the corporation or the suing 
stockholder individually - and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or 
other remedy?'"J03 Thus, as the Gheewalla court observed, a '"direct claim . . . is a 
claim on which the stockholder can prevail without showing an injury or breach of 
duty to the corporation, and one in which no relief flows to the corporation."'104 
Applying this basic rule in the zone of insolvency, the court distinguished 
two major rationales offered for treating directors as fiduciaries for creditors: (i) the 
"incentive-to-enforce" rationale, and (ii) the much-maligned "trust fund" theory.105 
The court first concluded that creditors would not have the same "incentive to 
enforce" fiduciary duties as shareholders if permitted to sue directly: 
Put simply, in contrast to stockholder and (by analogy in this limited 
context) creditor derivative actions, direct claims by creditors would 
not help the corporate collective because the benefit would accrue to 
the creditor bringing the direct claim. Any marginal benefit of s�ch 
enforcement effort potentially accruing to the corporate collective 
would likely be outweighed by the disruption of the established 
corporate governance mechanism. NACEPF h�� neither offered �ny 
persuasive policy rationale favoring recogrutJon of �u�h cl�1�s 
which might mitigate or rebut these concerns nor has It Identified 
99 Id. at *8. 
H JO Id. 
101 Id. at *9. 
1 02 Id. at *10 
103 Jd. at *11 (quoting Tooley v. Donaldson, LufKin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 
2004)) . 
• 104 Jd. (quoting Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC,
 2006 WL 846121, at 
6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2006)). 
105 Id. at *11 .  
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any case law supporting its theory that claims are directly assertible 
by creditors in this context.106 
The court further concluded that the trust-fund doctrine would create no 
basis for bringing a direct claim a gainst directors for zone-of-insolvency duty 
breaches because " [t]he court has traditionally been relu ctant to expand existing 
fiduciary duties."107 Here, it would be inappropriate to expand these duties (or the 
persons who may enforce them). Because "' [c]reditors are often protected by strong 
covenants, liens on assets, and other negotiated contractual  protections,"' among 
many other protections at law, '"one would think that the conceptual room for 
concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by inequitable 
conduct would be extremely small, if extant."'108 
Vice Chancellor Noble then turned to the question whether the standing 
analysis would somehow differ given the debtor's actual insolvency. The plaintiff 
apparently "placed heavy reliance" on Production Resources, arguing in effect that it, 
like the plaintiff there, was the victim of '"such a marked degree of animus"' by 
directors as to create an equitable cause of action.109 
As with his analysis of duties in the "zone," Vice Chancellor Noble focused 
on the direct/ derivative distinction. Here, the Vice Chancellor turned to the recent 
Big Lots decision for guidance,llO Like Gheewalla and Trenwick, Big Lots involved a 
plaintiff who confronted serious doctrinal obstacles.m In Big Lots, the problem was 
that the "creditor" - who had been the debtor's prior owner- held a " payment-in­
kind" (PIK) note that was not due until 2010- more than six years after the debtor 
we�t into bankruptcy and eight years after the acts that allegedly breached fiduciary 
duties to the plaintiff. The Big Lots defendants moved to d ismiss based, in part, on 
the fact that the plaintiff was in reality asserting a derivative claim that could only 
have
. 
been brought by the corporate debtor's bankruptcy estate. The court agreed, 
holdmg that the plaintiff's claims were '"classically derivative."' 1 1 2  
• • 1 06  Id. at *12. This may be true. But, as discussed in Part IV infra, this arguably mJsapphes the Tooley standing test. Here, under Tooley, the creditor suffered the alleged harm, ��d would benefit from th� recovery. �heewalla's analysis is curious, a little like saymg that ditors lack standmg to brmg drrect claims because the claims are not denvatwe. 
107 I d. at *13. 
108 Id. at :13 (quo�g Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCf Group, Inc., 863 A.2� 77�, ?90 (Del. �h. 2004). Indeed, he further observed "it would appear that creditors exist:In.g prote�ho�s- among which are the protections afforded by their negotiated agreements, theJr secunty mstruments, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent{ conveyance law and b�-L- t 1 • . . 
• . .  • laver o 
rotecti t 
' 
. 
ruu .... mp cy .aw- renaer t.�e lmposihon of an additional, umque , 
P 0�09 hrouff duect clalills for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary." !d. Id. at 14 (quoting Prod. Res. 863 A 2d at 798) 110 Id. at •1s. ' . . 
111  B' L 
28, 2006). 
1g ots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, 2006 WL 846121 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
m Id. at '7 (quoting Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 776) . 
I 
I 
--l.. 
I 
I 
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II ·  The Chewalla court read Big Lots aggressivelr According to Chewalla, Big 
Lots m substance, held that the scope of potentially cognizable direct claims 
assertible by creditors in the insolvency context is restricted to instances in which 
invidious conduct toward a particular 'creditor' with a 'clear entitlement to payment' 
has been alleged."113 According to Chewalla, the Big Lots decision " effectively limits 
direct claims, assuming arguendo that they are cognizable, by creditors of insolvent 
firms for breach of fiduciary duty to allegations of fact substantially similar to those 
pleaded by the plaintiff in Production Resources."ll4 
This inquiry, according to the Chewalla court, requires a two-step analysis. 
First, "the court must determine whether the plaintiff-creditor has pleaded facts 
demonstrating, with a high degree of certainty, that the creditor is entitled to 
payment and that the entitlement is either currently or imminently due."115 If the 
plaintiff-creditor satisfies the first step, the Cheewalla court required a determination 
as to whether the plaintiff has pleaded a "direct claim implicating invidious 
conduct."116 Applying this analysis, the Cheewalla court easily concluded that the 
plaintiff failed to allege facts satisfying the first step, namely that it was entitled to 
payment that was "clearly and immediately due."117 
Like the other post-Credit Lyonnais cases, Chewalla expressly relied on the 
priority-duty model, at least for certain purposes. Thus, limiting creditors to 
derivative c laims " is relatively uncontroversial" because "having been effectively 
placed 'in the shoes normally occupied by the shareholders - that of residual risk­
bearers' . . .  [creditors] are the principal remaining constituency with a material 
incentive to pursue derivative claims on behalf of the corporation . . . . " 1 1 8  Yet, the 
same logic did not apply to recognize direct causes of action. Priority would thus 
cause creditors to step into the shoes of shareholders for purposes of some, but not 
all, duty claims. 
II. The Puzzles of Directors' Duties to Creditors 
The directors' duties cases - especially Credit Lyonnais forward - present two 
puzzles. First, as we have seen, all embed a link between priority and duty. Second, 
these are long, discursive opinions. Much of what they discuss is not obviously 
m N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Found., Inc. v. Gheewal!a, 2006 W� 2:'88971. at *15 
(Del. Ch.  Sept. 1, 2006) (quoting Big Lots Stores, 2006 WL 846121, at 6) (emphasis m ongmal). 
1 1 4  Id. at *16. 
1 1s Id. 
1 16 Id. . 
1 17 Id. at *1 6-*17 ("The Defendants rightly !?oint out th.at .NA�EPF ha�. fa1led to 
demonstrate, through the facts pleaded in the Complamt, or even m 1ts bnef, that 1t was not 
paid what it was owed under the Master Agreement, or .that [NAC
EPF] pe:formed .under the 
terms of the Master Agreement in some way t�at tngge:ed an unfulfilled obhgatlon of 
Clearwire to pay [P]laintiff."') (quoting Defendants Reply Bnef at 1 2-�3). 
ns Id. at *12 (quoting Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 791) (footnote om1tted). 
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necessary to address the legal problem in question. If the link between priority and 
duty is so problematic, and we do not really want to give creditors any meaningful 
right to sue, what purpose do these opinions serve? 
A. The Puzzles of the Priority-Duty Model 
The logic of directors' duties to creditors is organized around the priority-duty 
model, which in tum depends on the viability of the "residual claimant," the 
hypothetical person with the last claim to a debtor's assets. When a finn is solvent, this 
will usually be the common shareholder. An enonnous body of theoretical work 
develops the claim that directors should cause firm activities to maximize value for 
shareholders.n9 Whether this same model works when a firm is in distress is, 
however, another matter- even though it lies at the heart of all of our cases saying 
that directors are fiduciaries for creditors of the distressed firm. 
1. Finding the Residual Claimant 
The residual claimant first appeared in the legal literature in an influential 
1983 article by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law.120 
Here, Easterbrook and Fischel sought to explain why corporate shareholders have 
the right to vote when so many (e.g., Berle and Means) had argued that the right to 
vote was meaningless.l21 Easterbrook and Fischel's  basic claim was that only the 
"residual claimant" has the proper incentives to make discretionary decisions 
regarding firm assets. Because "shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and 
incur most of the marginal costs" of corporate investment, " shareholders are the 
group with the appropriate incentives . . .  to make discretionary decisions." 122 
Why do shareholders have the most to gain or lose at the margin�? 
�asterbrook and Fischel do not say explicitly, but there is little doubt that priority 10 
nght of payment is behind their analysis. "When the firm is in distress," they argue, 
"the shareholders' residual claim goes under water, and they lose the appropriate 
119 See Directors' Duties, supra note 5, at 1244. 12° Fr�k H. East�rbrook_ & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J .L. & EcoN. 39� (1983). This was the first ma1or discussion of the topic by legal academics. The residual 
�laJmant had, however, been but one of many features of the view of the corporation as 
a 
n�xus of contracts," as famously espoused by such economists as Michael Jensen an
d 
Wilham Meckling. See id. at 401 (citing, among others, Michael Jensen & William Meckling, ����)�! the Fzrm: Managerza/ Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 ]. FIN. EcoN. 305 
t h 
121 Berle & Means argued that voting was meaningless because corporate manager
s­
�0 s ;reholders-exercised real control over all or most important matters in the life of the 
Prm. e
e AOOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C MEANS THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRJVATE ROPERTY 129 (1967) E b . · ' M ans 
Prescn
. ti. f thi · aster rook & F1schel, among others reJ·ected the Berle & ech 1 p on or s d"ti " · ' F . e supra note l20, at 397_ 
con 1 on, socral control" of corporations. See Easterbrook & IS ' 
122 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 120, at 403. 
I 
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incenti�es."123 Creditors, by contrast, "become residual claimants when equity 
holders cond�ct
. 
expose� them to unanticipated risk."124 Theirs is not principally a 
story about pnonty, but mstead about control . For Easterbrook and Fischel, it would 
appear that control, reflected in the right to vote, is deeply enmeshed in residual 
claimant status. "Voting exists in corporations because someone must have the 
residual power to act (or delegate) when contracts are not complete."t25 When a firm 
is insolvent, they say, "creditors eventually acquire control, through provisions in 
bond indentures and other credit agreements or through operation of bankruptcy 
laws."126 This occurs, they argue, because " voting rights flow to whichever group 
holds the residual claim at any given time."t27 
The residual claimant soon emigrated to the world of bankruptcy theory and 
became a central character in debates about the proper metes and bounds of corporate 
123 ld. at 404. "Other groups," they continue, "such as preferred stockholders or 
creditors, will receive the benefits of new decisions and projects until their claims are satisfied; 
the shareholders get only what is left over." Id. 
124 ld. This is one of several curious claims in this article. First, if we limit the analysis 
to the universe they select-public companies-it will not be "equity holders" whose conduct 
exposes creditors to unanticipated risk; it will be directors and officers. Shareholders may 
approve certain high leverage, final-period transactions- e.g., mergers and perhaps 
acquisitions- but only if proposed by directors (and, as a practical matter, officers). See, e.g., 
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c) (2007) (shareholders' right to approve merger agreements 
proposed by d irectors). Second, what does "anticipation" have to do with insolvency? Is the 
mference that creditors of insolvent firms would not be "residual claimants" if the risks were 
"anticipated"? What of creditors who anticipate nothing because- as with tort creditors ­
they did not choose to extend credit in the first place? 
125 I d. at 403. 
126 I d. at 404. 
. 
1 27 Id. at 405. There are problems with this claim. First, it would appear to be 
empirically false much of the time. Absent a contract that expressly grants a cred1tor some 
form of control - a  form that is highly unlikely to mimic that of sha.reholders- nothing about credi�or status or bankruptcy as such assures a vote. Rather, if a distressed corporate debtor 
goes mto bankruptcy, and if that bankruptcy case IS under chapter 1 1  of the Bankruptc� �ode, 
and if a plan of reorganization is proposed for the debtor, and if the creditor Is classified m 
such. a way as to qualify for a vote under section 1 126 of the Bankru
p�cy Code, then the 
creditor-as-residual-claimant will have a vote. See 1 1  U.S.C. § 1 126 (setting forth rules on 
voting on chapter 1 1  reorganization plans). An early and important study of the peculiarities 
of creditor democracy appears in David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effer;t of Corporate 
Votmg in Chapter 1 1  Reorganizations, 78 VA. L. R�v. 461 (1 992). See also Dzrectors Dutrcs, supra 
note 5, at 1 231 & n.188 (discussing voting issues m chapter 1 1  case�). . . . 
Notice that Easterbrook and Fischel did not argue that duectors owed fiducrary dutres 
to residual claimants. We know from their 1993 article on fiduciary duty that they have little 
use for duty at least as it is commonly understood. Frank H. Easterbrook & Dame! R. Fischel, 
Contract an/ Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425, 426-27 (1993) (fiduciary duty is, ��ey .argue, a 
contt:act that happens to be "characterized by ,�u
sually 
,
high .costs of �peofi��tion and 
morutoring"). Rather, they view duty at most as a gap filler, formmg terms m the corporate 
contract" that they impute to various corporate stakeholders. 
L 
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reorganization.128 Like Easterbrook and Fischel, the residual cl
aimant's leading 
supporters in bankruptcy, Professors Baird and Jackson argued that this ideali
zed 
character was the only party with the proper incentives to make optimal decision
s for 
the firm in reorganization_I29 Holding the "marginal" claim, this person would gain or 
lose at the margin from discretionary firm decisions.130 
Others disagreed, offering various reasons why this hypothetical person either 
made no sense or was simply unworkable. 
• Indetenninacy. Many writers observed that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to ascertain at any given point in time who among the debtor's 
constituents may be the residual claimant.131 Some valuation of the debtor 
would be required, and this would not necessarily be a cheap or useful 
undertaking.m Valuations can change during a case; would the identity of 
the residual claimant then also change? 
• Multiplicity. What if- as seems highly likely - there is no single residual 
claimant or class of claimants, but instead multiple claimants who might 
plausibly be residual claimants?133 They may compete amongst themselves; 
. 
128 The residual claimant's durability has led Professor LoPucki to liken it to horror-
movie staple Freddy Kruger. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of tile Res1dual Owner: An 
Empmcal Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1348 (2004) ("Like Freddy Kruger, the residual owner 
approach was mortally wounded in article after article, but would not die."). 
129 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargai11i11g After the Fall and the 
Contours of �he Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. On. L. REV. 738, 775 (1988) (" [T]he law of corpora�e 
reorgaruz.ations sho�ld focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency proble
ms m 
repre�e�tmg the resid�al owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the 
negotiati��s that the firm m�st �ake while it is restructuring."). . 
See George G. Tnantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt i11 In teracllve Cmyorate 
Governa,?ce, 83 c.A�. L. RE':. 1073, 1100 (1995) ("[T]he optimal solution" to financial distreSS woul? vest deas10n makmg authority with the residual claimants, who gain or lose at the 
margm from the actions of the firm."). 
" 131 See ?tephen J. Lub�n, '0e "New and Improved" Chapter 1 1 , 93 KY. �.J . �9'. 856 
�:004) ( Determm g which creditor IS at the bottom of the heap at any given time IS � diffi�}t 
erase that does not lend Itself to ex ante contracting, as asset values may change daily · · · · ) 132 See, e.g., Lo.Pucki, supra note 128, at 1345 ("To identify the residual owx:er 
presum�bly would reqmre valuation of the firm . . . . Yet, valuation is notoriously expensive and difficult." (footnotes omitted)). 
t . 
m See id. at 1343 (':The problem is not merely that single residual owners �re difficult 
.0 Identify . The problem 1s that they rarely exist."). Professor LoPucki's empmcal studY 
ll!dicates that, at least in the case of large public-comvanv reorganizations there are multiple classes of potential s'd 1 1 · " . • - � ' . · 1 1 " he not " . . re 1 ua c aimants. The existence of so many investor pnonty e
ve s, " 
ld �!� 
makes It hkely that investors at more than one level will share residual owner status. 
24 AM a�so 
James H.M. Sprayregen, et al., Chapter 11 :  Not Perfect, but Better than the Alternatwei 
· . ANKR . INsr. J . 1, 60 & n.13 (2005) ("It is our experience that there is no single resid�al 
���e�a;
n
cl�i��� 
c?�hle� chapter 11 case" and discussing the multiple classes of potennan 
5 m e onseco bankruptcy). For their part, Professors Baird and Rasmusse 
I 
~ 
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if someone (whether bankruptcy trustee or corporate director) is to act on 
their behalf, how should they choose? This was, in many respects, the heart 
of the problem that Credit Lyonnais attempted to address, since the residual 
claimant of a firm in the "vicinity" of insolvency is exceedingly difficult to 
identify _134 
• Institutional Choice. There is another question regarding the valuation needed 
to identify the residual claimant: who should do it? The modem bankruptcy 
reorganization system exists in part to save bankruptcy judges from the 
onerous- perhaps impossible- task of valuation.135 Can market actors be 
trusted to do so?136 We have grown increasingly suspicious of government 
actors - e.g., judges - who might interfere with competitive markets. But 
does the market really want to value debtors simply to determine the 
identity of the residual claimant?137 
Except when a firm is clearly solvent, or has an implausibly simple capital 
structure (akin to the one posited in Chancellor Allen's famous hypothetical), or is 
clearly insolvent and is being liquidated by directors (as in the early trust fund 
cases), identifying the residual claimant is exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, the 
logic of the residual claimant has been an enduring fiction in our discussions about 
directors' duties to creditors. 
dismiss this problem. "We do not rest on the idea that a single residual owner exists in every 
case. Hence, the argument that such creatures do not exist is neither here nor there." See Baird 
& Rasmussen, supra note 136, at 695 n.72. 
1� See discussion supra Part I.B.2. . , 
. 13" Peter Coogan characterized th� valuatwn process as a guess compounded by an estimate." See Peter F. Coogan, Confirmatwn of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv., 301, 313 n.62 (1982) (citing statement m H.R. REP. No. 95-598, at 225 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6181, 6184)). . . . 
136 A number of scholars think so, even when a firm 1s m bankruptcy. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 1 1  at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003); 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons_from Enron, 55 VAND._ L. REv. 1787, 1808 (2002); Douglas c. Baird & Robert K. Rasmusse_n, Pnvate Debt and the Mzssmg Lever of Corporate Govemance, 154 u. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) [heremafter Mzssmg Lever]; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 758-59 (2002); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors ' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance zn Chapter 1 1 , 152 U .  PA. L .  REv. 917, 917 (2003). . . 
137 Professor Blum noted that this basic question-whether valuation should be performed by markets or the government (bankruptcy judges)-has been a central questiOn m bankruptcy reorganization for many years. See, e.g., Walter J . Blum, The Law and Lnngunge of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 602 (1950). 
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2. What We Talk About When We Talk about Prior
ity138 
Identifying the residual claimant is the not the only problem
 with the 
priority-duty model. Perhaps even more difficult is the slippery
 nature of priority 
itself. When we talk about priority, we tend to assume that we know
 what we are 
talking about. Priority is said to be " absolute," as in the " absolute p
riority rule" 
(APR) . Although this glosses over some subtleties, the basic idea behind t
he APR is 
that senior dissenting creditors must be paid or provided for before junior
 parties 
(shareholders) may receive or retain property on account of their cla
ims or 
interests.139 
A full-blown history of priority is beyond the scope of this article. Priority is 
generally thought to derive from concerns about fraudulent conveyance, 
transactions that intentionally or effectively hinder, delay, or defraud creditors' 
collection efforts.t4D The modem conception of priority reflected in the APR can be 
seen as a response to perceived abuses in the railroad reorganizations that occurred 
through much of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.141 These reorganizations 
138 Apologies to Raymond Carver. See RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT 
WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LOVE (Vintage Books 1982) . 
139 See Directors' Duties, supra note 5, at 1229-230 (discussing "absolute priority rule" 
and collecting dta?ons). It is codified in section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code which, a�ong 
other things, provtdes that dissenting classes of unsecured claims either "receive or retam on 
account of such claim[s] pro�rty of a value . . .  equal to the allowed amount of the claim; or : · . the hol.der of an� clarm or mterest that is junior to the claims of such (dissenting] class 
WI� 
not receiVe or retam under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
140 David Skeel and George Krause-Vilmar recently observed in a draft article that 
frau�ulent con�eyance doctrine is "[t]he Ur doctrine" from which a variety of other equit�ble 
credttor prote�ons flow (including, in the case they consider, the recharacterization of instder 
loans) . . See Davtd A. Skeel, Jr. & George Krause-Vilmar, Recharacterizatio11 and the Nonhzndrance 
of Credztors, 2 (draft of Jan. 26, 2006 on file with author) (discussing Robert C. Clark, The Dutzes 
of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1977)). Every state has some fonn 
of fraudulent conveyance law. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 2 (19�8); 
UN!F . FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7 A U.L.A. 266 (1984), or a predecessor statute with s!�ar effect. .see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (1995). The Bankruptcy Code also contains snr
ular 
remedtes for fraudulent transfers. 11 U.S. C. § 548 (2006).  141 The · . b the 
B nk 
se reorgaruz?tions were, until 1933, governed largely by contract, not Y 
B
a
nk
ruptcy Cod.e or anythmg resembling it. In 1933, Congress enacted Section 77 �! the 
, a ruptcy �ct m order to address the "sudden evaporation of railroad earning powe
r that 
was plunging thousands of miles of lines into insolvency." Reorganization of Railroads Engaged m Interstate Commerce, PuB. L. No. 72-420 § 77 47 Stat 1 474 (1933), repealed by �ankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, PuB. L. No. 95-598, 92'Stat. 2549 (197S). See also REPORT OF THE c;'�MISSJON ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (1973) ("section 77 was 
�?fnally added to .the ���ptcy Act in 1933 and completely rewritten in 1935 for pu
rposes 
du�
rr��geme.nt, Simplification, and clarification."). A large body of literature was genera
ted 
PAUL 
g
D �
enod contemplating the merits of the system as it developed at the time. See, e.�;, 
C 
. RAVATH, THE REORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS IN SoME LEGAL PHASES 
ORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (19l7); Arthur H. Dean, Corpora
te 
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occ�rred n�t thro
_
ugh bankruptcy as we currently understand it, but through the 
eqmty receivership, a process that was thought routinely to violate "absolute" 
notions of priority_142 
Equity receiverships were said to be plagued by at least two evils. First, 
many - most promir:en�ly William 0. Douglas143 - argued that these reorganizations 
were controlled by msiders who profited at the expense of the railroads' various 
constituents, in particular widely dispersed unsecured (or undersecured) 
creditors.144 Frequently, these insiders were professionals - investment bankers and 
lawyers - who may not have had shares in the debtor, but who nevertheless profited 
Reorganization, 26 CORNELL L. REV. 537 (1941). Much of the recent literature on the residual 
claiman�'s �ontrol rights in bankruptcy rests on claims about the relative efficacy of railroad 
reorgamzatlons. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority 
Rrght�, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporation Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001) 
[heremafter Control]. A useful recent discussion of the realities of the railroad reorganizations 
appears in Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV . 1420 (2004) [hereinafter Railroad] . 142 As Dean explained: "The pattern, generally speaking, following the appointment 
of the receiver or receivers was for one or more of the various mortgage trustees to petition the 
receivership court for leave to foreclose the mortgage. The foreclosure action or actions [were] 
consolidated with the original general creditor's bill, and the receivers for the latter were then 
usually appointed receivers for the mortgage bondholders . . .  Following the formulation of a 
plan by the committee, the court on motion fixed an upset price for the sale of the mortgaged 
properties. Generally, the creditors or the reorganization managers bid in the properties, using 
the [bondholders'] deposited mortgage securities as part payment for the foreclosure price, 
and borrowed or raised enough cash to pay non-assenting or dissenting creditors. An 
agreement was then entered into with a new corporation created for the purpose, whereby, in 
consideration for the transfer to it of ( 1 )  the properties foreclosed at the foreclosure sale and (2) 
cash or securities to the extent provided in the plan, the new corporation would issue its 
securities in accordance with the reorganization plan." See Dean, supra note 141, at 538-39. 
143 SECURmES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION 
OF THE WORK, ACTIVmES, PERsoNNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES, PART I-VIII (1937-1940) (written under the direction of �il�iam 0. Douglas). 
Douglas was then a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Comm1ss10n. 
• 144 As Justice Cardozo explained: "There is little doubt_ that_ many of �hese 
receiVerships were legitimate and helpful. Non� the less. t_here res1?ed m the practice a capacity for abuses which will be found reflected m the dectstons o� this and ot�er c�urts. At 
hmes the receivership was used as an instrument of fral!d o: co�m. : . .  At tlmes 1t had a 
tend_ency to intrench delinquency in power, and to stifle mqmry mto acts of waste or spohation." See Duparquet, Huot & Moneuse v. Evans, �97 U.�. 216, 218 _(!�36). See also Dean, supra note 141, at 540 ("many features of the equity _rece1vers�1p were cnticrzed; the allegedly 
collusive nature of its inception; the delays; the d1�proportionate rate of expenses to ��bts 
when applied to small or medium sized corporations; the great opportumty for pohhcal 
patronage in the appointment of receivers and their counsel by judges . . . .  "); E. Menick 
Dodd, Reorganization through Bankruptcy: A �emedy for What?, 48 HARV. L. REv .. 1100, at 1 �oo,� 101 (1935)(claiming that a "tacit understandmg among, members ?f the bankmg fraternity meant that the reorganization would be managed by those p�rt1cular mve�tlner:t b,�nkers through whom the corporation had been accustomed to conduct 1ts long-term financmg ). 
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in the form of " generous" fees.145 Second, and for ou
r purposes more important, 
these proceedings frequently defied conventional notions 
of priority by permitting 
shareholders to maintain an interest in the road even though ce
rtain creditors would 
take little or nothing.146 
This defiance of priority norms led the Supreme Court to develop a the
ory of 
"absolute priority," articulated most famously in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber.147 Case 
held that reorganization plans had to be " fair, equitable and feasible," and that these 
were "words of art"148 that reflected the "'familiar rule' that ' the stockh
older's 
interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of creditors. First, of secured, a
nd 
then of unsecured, creditors."'149 
There is nothing terribly controversial about the APR or priority in general 
when one thinks about the liquidation of firms. It is easy to develop a strong case for 
the idea that in an actual, final-perio d  distribution of firm assets, creditors should 
receive those assets or their proceeds before equity holders. This would be a 
"recognition event that collapses all future possibilities to present value." 1 50  Priority 
on this view would be reflected in a broad spectrum of rules, from bankruptcy151 to 
prohibitions on the payment of dividends and other distributions while a 
corporation is insolvent,152 to the closely related doctrine o f  fraudu lent conveyance, 
145 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) 
Ban�ptcy Scholarshzp, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1075, 1089 (2000) ("the W all Street professionals who 
orgaruzed pr?t�ctive committees in order to negotiate the reorganization seemed to focus 
more on obtarmng generous fees for themselves than on striking a good bargain on behalf of 
the scattef!d investors whom they purported to represent.").  
. . Razlroad, supra note 141, at 1445 ("One of the most controversial 
features �f 
rec�1�ers�ps was the �eque�cy with which existing shareholders were able to maintain therr 
position m the reorgaruzed railroad, despite the failure to pay creditors in full .").  . , 
. . . See also Dean, supra note 141, at 541 . The classic discussion of this, and the 
"colluswn 
It Implied, appears in Northern Pac Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1912).  For a critical discussion of 
Boyd, see Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 393 (1999). . 
147 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
148 Id. at 1 15. 
C 
149 Id. at 116 (quoting Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. o., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899)). Nor would side agreements between seniors and i�ors ���eholders) be tolerated. " [A]ny arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate r�gh
ts 
f .�terests of the s�ockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior ogh
ts o e! er �ss ?f cred1tors comes within judicial denunciation." I d. Ba1rd & Rasmussen supra note 141 at 936 
is 
• � 151 .The Bankruptcy C�de's priority s�heme �pplicable to most business bankrUPtcie
s 
se, .orth m, among others, sections 507 726 & 1129(b) 1 1  U 5 C §§ �a7 '"'"6 g- 1 129rb) 12°06)· }52 Se f 1 I • • • • J I /L. "'-
' ' ' th t 
d. ct h 
c IOn 74 of the Delaware General Corporation Law for example provides a 1re ors w o willful! 1 .  ' 
' f the 
levels rmitted 
b Y �r neg Igent!Y_ �pprove the payment of a dividend in exces_s 0 ars 
follow� Y section 170 are JOIDtly and severally liable for a period 
of siX ye_ 
dissolve� �?�
ent of �e unlawful dividend to (i) the corporation and (ii) if the corpora�on comes msolvent, its creditors. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (2007). Secho
n 
d 
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which proscribes transfers by insolvents for less than fair value.153 These are, in 
simple terms, rules designed to ensure that creditors do not become residual 
claimants, and to provide certain remedies for them in the event that they do. 
In the absence of a liquidation, however, priority becomes a much more 
abstruse concept. Reorganization - the attempt to save rather than end the 
business - almost always involves negotiations among various constituencies. A 
critical question in these negotiations will be who controls all subsequent decisions: 
Do the stakeholders (however defined) trust current management (meaning 
directors and officers)? Have they lost confidence? What happens if d ifferent 
stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and creditors) have different views on this? To 
which stakeholders should directors listen? What happens if, after the fact, they 
listened to and acted for the wrong group? And, most important, is the residual 
claimant (if i dentifiable) presumptively the only one who matters here? 
When we talk about priority, we may really be talking about control - and in 
particular control of the decisions that might (or might not) resolve firm distress.154 
Priority in this more complex - and I suspect more common - context would 
function as a construct around which various claimants negotiate about who controls 
decisions about how (or whether) to fix the corporate debtor. Indeed, its role as a 
mechanism for facilitating negotiation may be its greatest value. In perhaps our 
greatest article on priority in bankruptcy reorganization, Professor Blum observed 
that " [r]enegotiation through reorganization under a fair plan based on 
reorganization value may be the least unsatisfactory adjustment to economic 
instability ."155 
This, in a sense, is what Credit Lyannais was really wrestling with. Because 
" [t]he possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives," Chancellor Allen 
told us, acting merely for the shareholder-as-residual claimant would be 
inappropriate, as it would "expos[ e) creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and 
2.02(b)(4) of the Model Business Corporation Act similarly penalizes directors for unlawful 
distributions. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (2002). 
ts3 See discussion at supra note 140. A history of t�e �raudulent conveyance laws 
appears in Jonathan c. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of No tree m Commerczal Fmance Law, 21 
EMORY BANKR. DEY. J. 421, 435-50 (2005) [hereinafter Secrets and Lzens] . . . 
�  Control, supra note 141, at 922 ("the central focus of corporate reorgamzallo�s 
should not be upon priority rights. Instead, as in corporate law generally, 1t should remam 
upon how the firm's assets are used and who controls them."). See also LoPuckL �upra note 
128; Lubben, supra note 1 31 . In a sense, this is the obverse of Easterbrook and Fzschel s analyszs 
of voting in the corporate context discussed at Part II.A.l, supra. . 
t55 See Blum, supra note 137, at 602. "This," h� w�nt ,on, "perhaps zs the most persuasive justification for our system of corporate reorgaruzahon. ld. See also Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrzne zn Corporat_e Reorganzzatzons, 41 U. CHI. L. RE�. 65 1  (1974) ("The function of the absolute priority doctrme has m essence been to set 
guidelines for carrying on these negotiations."). 
254 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance Vol l2:2 
creat[e} complexities for directors."156 Better to give directors a wide berth, to 
"conceiv[e} of the corporation as a legal and economic entity."157 If  directors act for the 
corporation "as entity" then the competing economic interests of the various 
stakeholders - including their priority - become secondary . While this may simply 
"punt"158 the hard problems of directorial-effort-during-distress, it may, at least in 
Chancellor Allen's view, empower directors to chart "both [an} efficient and [} fair [} 
course . . .  for the corporation."159 
The residual claimant is not the only person who could exercise control, or 
for whom directors should act. Baird (with Rasmussen), for example, has apparently 
changed tactics, and now argues that control should not necessarily reside in 
shareholding management (a conventionally junior claimant) but in senior 
creditors.160 Indeed, a number of writers observe that the senior creditor will be in 
possession and control of the debtor's assets, regardless of w hat we may say about 
the virtues of the residual claimant.161 
Notice what this means: If seniors will, or should, exercise control, then 
unspecified directorial efforts will no longer be for the benefit of the most junior 
claimant. They will instead be for the benefit of seniors. Since senior status is so easy 
to create contractually, it is decreasingly an "absolute" feature of the rules that 
govern corporate financial distress. If directors of distressed firms should, or will in 
156 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 12150, 
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n. 55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) .  Compare Prod. Res . . Group, L.L_.C. v. N0' Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("In insolvency, creditors, _as 
residual claim_ants to a definitionally-inadequate pool of assets, become exposed to substantial nsk as the enhty goes forward."). 
1s7 Id. 
1� See Directors' Duties, supra note 5, at 1224. 
159 See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n. 55. 
160 Missing �er, supra note 1 36, at 1227-28 (arguing that institutional and ba� 
le�ders ha�e �ontrol m reorganizations) (internal footnotes omitted). There are problem_s Wlth this analysis, mcl��mg that giving a lender contractual veto power over particular actions IS n�t the �ame as glVmg the lender the actual right to control firm decisions.  See id. at 1228-1230 (dJscussmg use of secured credit to exercise control over a debtor). See also DOUGLAS BAIR�, THE EL��ENTS OF �ANKRUPTCY 231-32 (4'h ed. 2006) (suggesting that the absolute priority rule IS not a cntical constderation for today's large bankruptcies) 161 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Contr�l of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX- L. �EV. 795, 797 (2004) ("The central theoretical argument of this Article is that control of the ankruptcy_ process, rather than formal rules of security and priority, is the key to m:de�st�dmg both secured-credit and bankruptcy law: Control is the function of bankrUptcy, 
�nontJ: lS the end for which it is employed"). See also Thomas E. Plank, The Credz tor lTl 
IX
f.:essw
_n u_nder the, Bankruptr:Y Code: History, Tnt. and Pnliru . . '>9 Mn. I . . RFV . 
2'11 12(){)0) 
r . ;.�··;sm_l> HiPil of .  ITPrhtor m nosSPssion"): Hi!TVPV R .  MiliPr & Shi!i y Wi!1Smi'IO· ThP s.;;;;r, In Jn;spsswn: rrPditnr rnntrnl nf rhantPr 1 1  RPnroanizatinn rasPS. 21 B ANI(R. 
thP · ,JST · 12001' ("Tht> PXPrriSP . . .  of rPmPdi;�l ri�>hts eivt>n .sPnJrPd crf�ditors 1 10�n 
debto��':7r�:;:r.").
f default, in effect, puts those creditors in control of e 
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fact: act f�,
r t�e benefi: of se�ors, what sense does it make to say that they have 
duties to restdual clmmants such as unsecured creditors? Why should we care 
about juniors when seniors will run the show? 
B. The Doctrinal Relevance of Directors' Duties to Creditors 
Priority is not the only puzzling feature of the directors' duties cases from 
and after Credit Lyonnais. A second puzzle reflects the gap between their rhetoric and 
their reality. Much of their ample discourse appears not to have been required by the 
questions presented. Moreover, cases like Omnicare - which are not viewed as 
involving duties to creditors - suggest that Delaware is reluctant to use this 
"doctrine" when it might actually determine outcomes. These cases say a great deal, 
but actually hold very little, when it comes to directors' duties to creditors. 
1. The Directors' Duties Discourse 
Consider first Credit Lyonnais. As discussed above, the central dispute in that 
case was about the bank's right to seat directors, as provided in a restructuring 
agreement that the controlling shareholder had entered into. There appears to have 
been little dispute that this agreement was enforceable and that the bank had the 
right to seat its directors. It was only because the controlling shareholder asserted 
that the bank-appointed directors had breached a fiduciary duty to him that the 
question of directors' duties arose at all. The discussion of directors' duties to 
creditors - in a lengthy footnote, no less - was in many ways extraneous to the issue 
at hand.162 After all, the plaintiff, Parretti, was a shareholder -not a creditor. 
So, too, with Production Resources. This was in essence a collection case 
involving a single creditor seeking repayment from a recalcitrant debtor. According 
to the complaint, before suing in Delaware, the plaintiff, PRG, had obtained writs of 
execution in Connecticut state court which were returned unsatisfied.163 Meanwhile, 
the complaint alleged, NCT was engaging in fraudulent conveyances and conveying 
assets to the controlling shareholder, Salkind, that were also subject to competing 
security interests in favor of PRG.164 Vice Chancellor Strine could have dismissed the 
duty claims without prejudice until a determination on these other matters was 
1"2 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.SS (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
163 See Production Resources Complaint, supra note 60, at 1 0, '1 26. , 164 Id. According to the complaint, the debtor corporation �0 acceded to a request by Ms. Salkind's attorney (which reque�t appears to have_ 
been m1t1ated by NCT) to take 
physical  possession and control of vanous collater�l which . purymrtedl�, was previOusly pledge d  to her and as to which PRG claimed competing �cunty mterests. ld: By means of these transfers "and other artifices, NCT is now resorh�g to full-s[c]ale [sic] fraudulent conveyances in favor of its insiders and to the detriment of Its other consbruents, such as bona fide creditors." Jd. 
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made.l65 He chose not to and instead issued his lengthy d i scuss
ion of directors' 
duties to creditors based on the problematic priority-duty model. 
The same can be said for Trenwick and Gheewal/a. In Trenwick, for example, it 
appears that the plaintiff (the Litigation Trust) had no standing to pursue any
 direct 
claims of Trenwick America creditors because none w ere assigned to it und
er 
Trenwick America's plan of reorganization or otherwise. 1b6 Why wasn't the failure to
 
convey the claims in the first place sufficient to resolve the question? Why the 
extended discussion about the direct/ derivative distinction? 
Perhaps more curious was the corporate debtor's  financial condition. 
According to the Vice Chancellor, the plaintiffs failed to plead insolvency (or, 
apparently, the "zone").167 If, as the Vice Chancellor observed repeatedly, neither 
Trenwick Parent nor Trenwick America was insolvent at and after the 
consummation of its acquisition and restructuring transactions,1 0R it is not clear why 
any further discussion was needed. He could have ended about  five pages in, when 
he noted that "the Litigation Trust has failed to plead facts supporting the inference 
that either [Trenwick Parent] or [Trenwick America) were insolvent at the time of the 
transactions challenged in the complaint."l69 Rather, he continued for forty-five more 
pages - nine times more discussion than appears necessary. 
. G
heewalla is an especially good example of an opinion ranging far from its 
mstrumental goals. First, it was not even clear the plaintiffs w ere creditors,1 70 or that 
the defendants were capable of acting in a directorial capacity .1 71 Second, the cour
t 
• 165 See Ash v. _McCall, 2000 WL 1370341, at •14 (Del. Ch. 2000) (giving plaintiff m
ore 
time_to am�nd complamt to allege sufficient facts indicating current d irectors failed 
to pursue 
a drum agamst fo�er directors in a marmer that is grossly negligent or self-interested). 
(2006). 
1 66 Trenmck Am. Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 190-91 
. 167 A fa!r. reading of the Amended Complaint confirms this. Amended Com
plaint, 
�:����� Am. L1tigation Trust v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., C.A. No. lS7l-N (filed Sept. 
20, 2005, 
. 168 Trenwick Am. L!tigation Trust, 906 A.2d at 202 (2006) ("I  reiterate that the complaint �Is �p�
:d facts supporting a �ational inference that Trenwick America was insol
vent bef�re 
Y
bl t ti
�h
fy
all_enged transactions would, when consummated leave Trenwick Amenca una e o sa s 1ts creditors."). ' 
169 Id. at 173. 
S I d�
70 Gh�ewa/la, 2006 WL 2588971, at •1 (characterizing plaintiff as "putative creditor
"). 
ee a so ISCUSSion at Part r c 3 A · . f ct f the B . Lot . 
· · ' supra. smnlar observation can be made about the a s 0 
";fayrn!�����k�d���?Km) uch of Gheewal/a's analysis rested. In Bif Lots, the "creditor" hadit: 
com Jaint s· 
note that was not yet due at any o the times relevant to 
Ma/28 20�r) 
L�Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fu11d VII, LLC, 2006 WL 846121, at *2 (Del. C� 
aid it �ould 
. le we do not know the currency in which this PIK note would have bee 
he b�rgained f�fk
a
:��d
o have been m��eY:. �us, even if the plaintiff rece�ved ev
eryth�� 
the debtor would like I 
h not h�ve b�n pa1d m any conventional sense-h1s mvestrnen 
171 As di 
Y 
d
ave continued m some different form. d 
Gheewa/la 2006 wt
cusse abov; the three directors sued were not a majority of the b<;>
ar · 
' 2588971, at 1 .  Instead, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants  effectiv
ely 
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devotes about half of its analysis to the question of standing in the case of a debtor in 
the vicinity of insolvency.172 If, however, the court "accepted" the proposition that 
the debtor was insolvent,173 the entire discussion about the "vicinity" is overkill. It is 
the obverse of Trenwick's problem: Whereas in Trenwick, the absence of meaningful 
distress leads us to question the relevance of any further duties-to-creditors d octrine, 
here the problem was the debtor's clear insolvency. If the debtor was already 
insolvent, then directorial action while in the " zone" seems extraneous.174 
A logical inference would be that, so far as Delaware is concerned, talking 
about directors' duties to creditors is more important than recognizing them. 
Perhaps the most potent support for this thesis appears in the recent and 
controversial Omnicare decision, a case which suffers for its failure to recognize and 
apply directors' duties doctrine in a manner consistent with its development to that 
point_175 
2. Omnicare -The Silencing of Vice Chancellor Lamb 
NCS Healthcare (NCS) was an insolvent public Delaware corporation which, 
despite its financial condition, became the subject of a protracted bidding contest 
between two companies, Omnicare and Genesis. NCS rejected Omnicare's initial 
offers because, among other reasons, they were financially inadequate and would 
have required NCS to consummate the transaction through a bankruptcy filing.176 
Due to its "precarious financial condition,"177 NCS' board believed that a more 
certain and lucrative transaction with Genesis was in the interests of the entire 
enterprise, a position it believed was supported, if not compelled, by Credit 
Lyonnais.17B NCS thus entered into a merger agreement with Genesis which included 
a " draconian" exclusivity provision.179 
had the power to control Clearwire by virtue of their affiliation with Goldman Sachs, which 
was allegedly  its "only source[ ]  of funding." Id. 
172 Id. at *11-14. 
173 I d. at *18. . 
174 If the distinction was factually important-because, for e�ample, t!"e duectors took 
a course of action while in the zone that led to insolvency - the opm10n certa1nly does not say 
so. 
175 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
176 Id. 
177 I d. at 922. · 
f f t "  178 The Omnicare Chancery Court opinion sets out m a . ootnote excerpts o tes 1mony 
of one NCS director, Richard Osborne, which descnbes how distress apparently affected the 
board's decision-making process: . 
Q [By plaintiffs' attorney] In your role as a member of the_speoal 
committee: did you think it wa_s appropriate for
 NCS to enter mto an 
exclusivity agreement with Genesis? . . . 
A. [By NCS Director Osborne] VJ_e were �� a situation where a 
· · 
rtu · ty was developing w1th Genesis. One that had the prom1smg oppo m 
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Two NCS directors held a majority of NCS' voting power. " [ A]cting in their 
capacity as NCS shareholders," they executed a specifically enforceable agreement to 
vote their shares in favor of an NCS merger with Genesis.180 After NCS executed the 
exclusivity and voting agreements, Omnicare offered a superior proposal 
conditioned on the completion of due diligence.181 Omnicare made a public tender 
offer and NCS's board withdrew its recommendation that the stockholders vote in 
favor of the NCS-Genesis merger.JB2 
Chancery court had little trouble upholding the N CS-Genesis merger 
agreement when the plaintiff-shareholders sued to enjoin it.J83 Viewing the issue as 
one of business judgment, Vice Chancellor Lamb began his analysis by observing 
that the question before the court was not " whether one deal [ was] better than the 
other."184 By the time litigation began, it was clear that Omnicare's bid was better. 
Rather, the question was whether the directors " breached the fiduciary duties they 
owe to all the corporation's stakeholders" when they approved the Genesis merger 
agreement.185 
NCS' insolvency was apparently an important, perhaps dispositive, fact for 
Vice Chancellor Lamb: 
Before turning to the analysis of the directors' d ecision-making 
process, it must be observed that the NCS directors were not 
operating m wholly normal circumstances. In fulfilling their 
responsibilities to manage the Company's " business and affairs," the 
Director Defendants certainly owe fiduciary duties to NCS and its 
promise of substantial recovery for-for creditors . . .  , and also the chance of 
a significant value for shareholders. 
The comp
_
any continued to be circling insolvency. We had talked 
to 50-plus comparues and none had resulted in a deal. We had OmniCare, 
who had repeatedly offered only bankruptcy and no recovery for 
shareholders. 
_
We were
_ 
very mindful of our responsibility to all the stakeholders, 
but particularly given our perilous condition to the noteholders and senior 
debt. And of course in this case, because of the chance of recovery for 
shareholders, it was very clear to me that we should be extremely careful to 
nurture and preserve this opportunity given the circumstances.  
. . 
In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., 825 A.2d 240 259 n.44 (2002) (quoting Osbom
e 
Deposition at 1 07-08). 
' 
179 0 . . . 
. . 
mmcare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 923. The Supreme Court majority and d1ssentm
g 
opm10ns use the term "draconian" to describe the exclusivity provisions of the merg
er 
agreement no less than 8 times. 
180 Id. at 923, 926. 
181 Id. at 924. 
182 I d. at 926. 
183 In re NCS Healthcare, 825 A.2d at 256 
184 I d. at 244. 
· 
185 Id. 
• 
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�tockhold��s. But, as directors of a corporation in the "zone of 
znsolvency, the NCS board members also owe fiduciary duties to the 
Company's creditors. There is no doubt that NCS was insolvent at all 
relevant times, as it was in default on and unable to repay approximately 
$350 million in debf.186 
259 
Thus, Vice Chancellor Lamb reasoned, NCS' directors "were not entitled to 
consi
.
der only the int�rests of the stockholders, but instead had a fiduciary duty to 
take mto account the mterests of all of the [a]ffected corporate constituencies."IB7 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in a rare split opinion, reversed the Chancery 
Court, holding that the board's approval of the NCS-Genesis transaction should 
have been reviewed not as a matter of business judgment, but instead under the 
more stringent Unocal analysis.lBB The court found that the merger agreement 
flunked Unocal because the deal protection devices were preclusive and coercive, 
and were not within the reasonable range of responses to the threat of losing the 
Genesis offer.1B9 
Chief Justice Veasey (along with Justice Steele) dissented. The Chief Justice 
accused the majority of adopting "a new rule of law" prohibiting boards from acting 
"in concert with controlling stockholders to lock up" a merger.190 He noted that at 
the time the lock-up provisions were agreed upon, Omnicare's best proposal would 
force NCS into bankruptcy, fail to pay all of NCS' creditors, or return anything to 
NCS' stockholders.191 The Chief Justice viewed the lock-up as adding value to the 
186 Id. at 256-57 (internal footnotes omitted; citing among other things, Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)). 
187 Id. at 257. Plaintiffs' counsel had argued that entering into the Genesis agreement 
itself constituted a breach of the duty of care. The Vice Chancellor found the argument 
"unpersuasive" because the directors knew that "without a competing deal from Genesis, 
Omnicare would [not] have . . .  offered a deal" other than one through a bankruptcy case, a 
proceeding the directors decidedly wanted to avoid. The decision to go with the Genesis offer 
in these circumstances was "rational (and, indeed, reasonable)." I d. at 259. 
188 This would require the NCS directo�s to demonstrate first that, in causing �he 
corporation to enter into the merger agreem�nt, they �ad ;,easonable .grounds for. behevmg that a .danger to corporate policy and effe�v�ess exist�d by showmg t
heir actions were 
taken m good faith after a reasonable investigation. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 
818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003) (quoting Unocal Co�. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946: 955 
(Del. 1985)). Second, it would require the NCS d�rector� to show that the defe�sive measures 
taken in the merger agreement were "reasonable m relatiOn to the threat posed. ld. 
189 Omnicare, Inc., 818 A .2d at 936. The court reasoned that the devices were coercive because the NCS shareholders would be forced to accept the Genesis mer�er even though 
eighty percent of NCS public shareholders supported the Orru'1!care tender o.fer. !d. ,�t 935-3� . }he deal protection devices in aggregate were. pre�lusive because they ma.de It 
mathematically impossible' and 'realistically unattamable for the Omn1care transaction or 
any other proposal to succeed, no matter how superior the proposal." ld. at 936. 
190 Id. at 940. 
191 Id. at 941 . 
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transaction by allowing NCS and Genesis to "exchange certainties."m Because 
creditors could have forced NCS into bankruptcy a t  any time, if NCS rejected the 
lock-up provisions the board potentially risked losing Genesis as a bidder, thereby 
risking any return to shareholders.193 If Genesis walked away from the deal and 
NCS' business prospects dimmed further, the board's refusal may have forced them 
to accept less desirable bids.194 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in the Supreme Court opinion appear to 
think that the debtor's insolvency had bearing on the directors' conduct, or their 
review of that conduct. Indeed, the majority opinion simply ignores the Vice 
Chancellor's analysis on this key point. If the majority had in fact believed the 
rhetoric about duties to creditors, one might expect that, at minimum, the board 
would have been protected by the " spirit" of Credit Lyonnais - that the business 
judgment rule insulated their entity-saving tactic. Yet not a w ord was said about 
directors' duties to creditors.195 From this we can infer that Delaware courts appear 
to be more comfortable talking about directors' duties to credi tors and the priority­
duty model than actually using them . If the Delaware Supreme Court will go out of 
its way to avoid using Credit Lyonnais' protective implications, the "doctrine" of 
192 !d. at 942. 
193 !d. 
194 !d. 
. 195 Former Chief Justice Veasey later acknowledged that the fact that the b�siness Judgment ru.le s�ould have applied "was particularly true because of the dilemma fanng th� NCS .board m VJew of the specter of insolvency." See E. Norman Veasey & Christme \ DI 
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law a11d Governance from 1 992-2004. A 
Retr:ospectiv.e on So�e Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1 459-460 (2005). In a later law review article, VIce Chancellor Strine (author of the Productio11 Resources opinion) also 
addressed the problem �e majority ignored: 
Equally m!erestin� is to imagine what exposure the NCS board would have faced 
had they, m reaction to Omnicare's last-second, conditional expression of mterest, 
refus�d to accede to Genesis's terms. Assume Genesis w alked away and that 
Omnicare. retu:n�d to its preferred strategy of a bankruptcy deal and refuses to offer a transactio:r:' giVmg full repayment to NCS's creditors. Eventually, Omnicare gets the 
company Wlth no payment to the equity and only eighty cents on the dollar to the credJt.ors. The creditors sue the NCS board for turning Genesis away becau.se, they plausibly . contend, the company was insolvent at the time the key denswn was made. This alternative scenario was not considered in the majority opinion, nor was 
there consideration of the fact,. because NCS was insolvent or nearly so, any risks 
tha: 
the board took to achieve a higher payment for the equity necessarily represent�d muc� !.ower pe�centage of. the company's total enterprise value than in the sce�ano 
of 
a
e
thnvmg, profitable p�bhc .company. Refusing to put at risk a deal guar
anteemg full 
r payment to the creditors m exchange for an increase for the equity is, at the ve� least, more �derstandable in this setting, and there are non-frivolous !ega �guments av.�able to creditors that directors must consider creditor interests wh
en 
e comp�y 15 m the so-called "zone of insolvency" and, more certainly so, when the cor:tpany IS actually insolvent. Strine, supra note 10, at 901 n.99. 
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directors' duties :o creditors cannot have great legal force. It may be well and good 
t� say that cred1t?rs become residual claimants to whom (or for whose benefit) 
d1rectors owe dubes. But, the Delaware courts seem to be saying, that is all it is ­
something good to say. 
This may have led some academics to conclude that directors' duties to 
creditors have no significance, and are, in Professor Bainbridge's words, " much ado 
about little."196 In many cases, Bainbridge thinks, the business judgment rule would 
insulate directors,197 or creditors will protect themselves contractually.J98 Directors' 
duties to creditors will have no practical consequence. While these suppositions may 
in themselves be questionable,199 the more important question is the most basic: If 
they are correct, and directors' duties to creditors are doctrinally irrelevant, why 
have the courts in cases from Credit Lyonnais to Gheewalla bothered to say so much 
about them? 
III. The Expressive Functions of Directors' Duties to Creditors 
The answer may be that the Delaware courts are trying to tell us something 
about the developing nature of the relationship between directors and corporate 
creditors, and the principles of priority, duty and contract that inform this 
relationship, even if they do not necessarily want to create liability rules in the 
process. They may, in short, be engaging the "expressive" function of law. 
Traditional economic or imperative accounts of the interaction between 
people and law tend to assume that law works because it coerces.200 More recent 
accounts, by contrast, imagine that we respond to law at least in part because of 
196 See Bainbridge, supra note 9. . . . . 197 Jd. at 34-36. Professor Ribstein (with Kelh Alces) offers an elaborahon on th1s v1ew. 
See Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, The Business Judgment Rule in Good and Bad Times, ] .  Bus. '!z TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007) ("The legal quandary of wh_o should be �;'ed duties in the msolvency scenario disappears . . . in the face of the busmess Judgment rule ) (draft of Oct. 17, 
2005 at 4, on file with author). 
198 Bainbridge, supra note 9 at 26 ("[c]reditors could protect them�elves ex ante either by negotiating contractual limitations on corporate beh�v10r, such as restnchons on the types of projects in which the firm may invest, or by negotiating for a share of the up-s1de, such as through the use of convertible debt securities."). 
199 For example, Norman Veasey, �e former c;hief Justice of the �elaware Supreme Court, would appear to have a different v1ew than Ba1�bnd�e, charactenzmg the duhcs-to­creditors problem as "very challenging" See Veasey & D1 G�ghelmo, supra note 1 95, nt 1 429 & 
n.107 (2005). So, too, would the law firm. �f Wachte��, L1pton, Rosen � Katz, . which has o?served that "[d]irectors' choices [are] difficult ones . when a co�por�tJOn IS m hna�c1al distress. Jd. (quoting Memorandum from Theodore_N. M1rvls, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Delaware Speaks to Directors of Troubled Compames (Dec. 1, 2004)). 
zoo Adjudication, supra note 13, at 1045 ("On� dominant answ�r [to t,�e question of why pe?ple obey law] is that the threat of sanctions motivate legal comphance. ) .  For a d•scuss1on of Imperative theories of law, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (2d cd . 1980). 
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what it says, both in its own terms and about us 
as its subjects.201 Thus, we recognize 
that law - and in particular law made by courts - can
 have meaning and social force 
independent of the "holding" of a particular case. The
 directors' duties to creditors 
cases - especially from Credit Lyonnais forward - may be b
est understood as 
examples of expressive adjudication. 
The notion that law generally performs an expressive function
 is not new,202 
but has in the past decade taken on a special force in helping us t
o understand why 
we have and obey laws even when they may not as a realistic matte
r be enforced or 
enforceable. This part describes the expressive theory of law, and ho
w this theory 
helps to solve the puzzles of directors' duties to creditors. I also offer some
 thoughts 
on what the Delaware courts might be telling us. 
A. Expressive Theories of Law 
The expressive theory of law holds that "the expression of social values is 
an 
important function of the courts or, possibly, the most important functio
n of 
courts."203 This account of law is fuzzier, more nuanced than tradit
ional 
explanations, and thus inherently easier to criticize.2D4 Law may be expressive 
from 
the perspective of those who generate law, those who consume it, or - more likely
­
both. 
If we are concerned about the generation of expressive laws, we focu
s 
largely on legislatures and courts.205 Expressive theories of law w ould say that tho
se 
who make law do so not merely because of the crudely causal results they expec
t 
201 Fnr:al Pnin.t. sunra notP n. at 1 fi'iO-Sl ("Thp thPsis i s  that thP lilw influpnrf'S 
hf'ha:rior ind:nf'ndt>nt of �hP s;m:,nons it threatens to impose, that  law works by what i
t 
says rn add1tion to what 1t does. ); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 2022 ("Many people support 
law because of the statements made by law, and disagreements about Jaw are frequently 
debates over the expressive content of law. "). 
. 202 As M�tthew Adler has observed, it dates back at least to the 1960s
, when 
philosophers considered the expressive functions of criminal punishment . See MattheW D. 
Ad�er, Express�ve Theones of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 u. PA .  L. REV. 1363, 1370 (2000) (citing Joel Fernberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965)) . See �/so 
H
I
.L.A. HART, �IS�MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) {discussing the ways in which cn
rrunal 
aw expresses soCial JUdgment). 
: See Coo��r, supra note 13, at 586 (footnote omitted). 
D. A 1 
For � cnhque of such �eo�es a:'d an exchange, see Adler, s upra note 202; Matthew 
A R 
d
l er, Lm��zstzc Meamng, Nonlmguzstzc Expression ' and the Multiple Variants of Expresszvzsm. 
& Ri��a!
o Pro;essors Anderson and Pi/des, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson 
(2000). 
d H. P!ldes, Expresszve Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 150
3 
205 See e g Jo R n£E AMERICAN T ' . .  , S
EPH · GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND 
More Statisti��
ERANCE Mo�EMENT 177 n.83 (2d ed. 1986); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
1291, 1318 n.2S 
���:':'�uaszon: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. R�· 
416 n.18 (1999). 
( ), an M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 41 ' 
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from those who fear its sanctions, but also because they wish to make more and 
per�ap� riche
_
r statements about themselves, their institutions and the larger social 
setting m wh1ch law and legal messages are generated and transmitted . A popular 
example of this invol�es race discrimination: When legally sanctioned, it is wrongful 
both because of what 1t does and what it means.206 Striking race discrimination, as in 
Brown v. Board,207 is said to have had expressive consequences, value in virtue of the 
statements made in the judicial opinion itself, even if courts ultimately could not 
realize its aspirations.208 Law matters because of what it says about those who make 
it. 
Expressivism also considers the transmission of these statements to laws' 
consumers, and asks how and why we obey or respect laws even as we may believe 
they are unlikely to be enforced or enforceable.209 Richard Pildes, for example, has 
argued that constitutional rights are not " trumps", but rather that the constitutional 
system " provides a more expansive conception of harm because it is more attuned 
than conventional rights theory appreciates to the social meanings of state action. 
Expressive harms, no less than material harms to these kind of individual interests, 
ground constitutional doctrine in many areas."210 Law matters because of what it 
says to and about those subject to it, not merely what it does.211 
The Delaware case law on directors' duties to creditors is best viewed as 
expressive law-making for several reasons. First, the important features of these 
cases are non-instrumental. Credit Lyonnais matters because of what it says about 
directorial discretion, not whether (or under what circumstances) directors will (or 
206 "Much of the debate over school segregation," Cass Sunstein writes. "was also a 
debate about the meaning of laws calling for segregation." See Sunstein, supr� note 13, at 2022 
(1996). Professor Brest generated what is often consi�ered the leadmg expressiOn of th1s v1e'"':' : 
Decisions based on assumptions of in�stc ':"orth �nd selective md1fference mf!Jct 
psychological injury by stigmatizing thetr vtchms as mfenor. Moreover, because acts 
of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their victims suffer espeoally 
frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries. . . . . . 
Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antldlscrzmnzatzon 
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976). 
207 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954). 
. 
2os See Sunstein, supra note 13, _at �02� ("
Plessy v. Ferguson asserted that 
[discriminatory] laws did not "mean" black infenor�ty; Brown v. Bo�rd of Educa/1011 �ned to 
respond to this assertion with empirical work suggesting the contrary. ) (footnotes om1tted). 
209 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SociAL PSYCHOLOGY 01- PROCEDURAL }USTICE (Springer 1988); TOM TYLER, �HY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Yale Umvers1ty Press 1 990); 
Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Ut1llty of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 468� 70 ( 1 997), Mark 
C. . Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normatwe and Cogmtrve Perspecflves m the Socwl 
Snentific Study of Law, WIS. L. REV. 475, 486-90 (1997). . . . 
210 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Socwl Mcanmg,, Expresswc Harms, and Constitu tionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 744-47, 755-60 (1998). 
211 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 2022. There are also attempts to argue that the 
expressive nature of law can have causal consequences. See Focal Pomt, supra note 13 .  
264 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance Vol l2:2 
will not) be liable to creditors. The recent cases constraining Credit Lyonnais' 
doctrinal implications are similarly more useful for their explorations of the
 nature 
of director-creditor relations than for their particular holdings, telling credito
rs, in 
effect, not to get their hopes up. 
Second, and perhaps more telling, is the sheer volume and nature of the 
verbiage. These are long, discursive opinions, academic in tone and perhaps intent. 
They are heavily footnoted.m They are often rich in hypotheticals and policy 
analysis. Although they are not law review articles, in many respects they read that 
way. 
Third, these are hortatory opinions, akin to the corporate law "sermons" 
Professor Rock observed in his important article on the generation of governance 
norms, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?m Here, Rock 
looked at the development of Delaware jurisprudence on management buyouts 
(MBOs) in the 1980s to see whether it would offer deeper insights into the ways that 
fiduciary duty rules and standards are generated and disseminated. He concluded 
that it did, often taking the form of " sermons" designed to " generate in the first 
instance the legal standards of conduct (which influence the development of the 
social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) ."214 Like the MBO cases (and as 
discussed further below), the cases on directors' duties to creditors are based in part 
on exhortations about directorial behavior at the margins. They are, as Rock said of 
the MBO cases, " parables - instructive tales - of good managers and bad managers, 
of good lawyers and bad lawyers, that, in combination, fill out the normative job 
description of these critical players."215 Even if the courts in the directors' duties to 
creditors cases are reluctant to generate a "rule" with a clear instrumental purpose, 
they nevertheless are attempting to express the values they want directors to 
internalize in this context. 
Some may object to the expressive characterization. First, objectors might 
�ay, if I am correct that there is no " doctrine" in any meaningful sense, then what th
e 
1mportant Delaware opinions give us is dicta, not rules (or perhaps even 
212 �redit Lyonn�is had � comparatively modest 56 footnotes but is, of course, most famous for 1ts footnote. ::J5. Credzt Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55. Productz.on Resources has 96; Trenwzck
.
has 155; and Gheewalla has 166. I am not making an empirical claim that these ca_ses necessanly have more footnotes than other cases, or that the number 
of 
footnotes by 1t�lf renders them expressive, only that much of the important analysis in these cases IS located m a place far from the typical "hold. " 213 Edward B R ck S · d · m
g
. W k? 44 
UC 
1 · 0 ' amts an Sznners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law or · , 
LA L. REV. 1009 )997). 
Ed d 
�4 �· t 1016·. Professor Rock, along with Professor Wachter, further refined this i� 
G 
war . ·c oc &_ Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self 
, 
overnzng orporatwn, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001 ), where the develo ed the idea of the non-leg���y enforceable rule or standard." See id. at 1641 . 
y p 
See Rock, supra note 213, at 1016. 
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standards) .216 Can something that is not a "rule" have expressive force? Wouldn't 
the demonstrated ambiguity of the Delaware courts' language on duties to creditors 
defeat whatever expressive attributes they may have? How can the Delaware courts 
be expressing anything about this if they don't know what they are trying to say? 
The answer, I think, is that ambiguity in the message - noise in the signal ­
may distort the expression, but these courts are still trying to express something 
important. Indeed, I think expressivism may be an important - perhaps the only 
appropriate - manner in which courts can experiment with the values they hope 
may grow someday into norms and, perhaps, from norms to standards and rules. 
Courts that " make" law when it matters run the risk of overstepping judicial bounds, 
whether by i gnoring precedent, competing with other branches of government, or 
both. Expressivism, however, creates space within which courts can explore the 
values that might be involved in the complex problems presented by priority, duty 
and contract without necessarily making a commitment that affects the current 
parties or even those who might otherwise be affected directly by the statements. 
Experimental, expressive statements may in the long run help courts to develop 
better rules and standards to guide, but not necessarily compel, behavior. 
Second, I do not think expressivism means that law will lack force. The dicta 
of the Delaware opinions may be expressive, but it may also be a form of warning to 
corporate actors (directors, officers, professionals). Saying that the rule exists - even 
if it currently lacks conventional force - gives a court the ability to use it in the future 
if it believes circumstances warrant. The statement has in terrormz value because 
future actors will know it could shift from the expressive to the imperative if they 
deviate too far from the standards it articulates. Delaware's case law on du ties to 
creditors has expressive force because of the threat embodied in the possibility that it 
may actually be used in extreme cases. 
A second objection might observe that some of these opinions - Credit 
Lyonnais in particular - were not "published" in a traditional sense. That decision 
appeared originally only as a slip opinion,217 and was not officially published. It 
achieved notoriety due principally to some media hand-wringing, notably an article 
by law professor John Coffee.21s Indeed, many of the Delaware cases on directors' 
duties to creditors appear only in the unofficial, online versions. How expressive can 
these opinions be, if the courts are not even publishing them? 
216 See d iscussion about d icta, supra note 8. . . 
2 11 Styled Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commumcat10ns Corp., 
No. 12150, 1 991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), the case was initially available 
only as a slip opinion from the Delaware Chancery Court, and, accordmg to Lex1s personnel, 
was added to its database in 1995. 
21s John c. Coffee, Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors ' Duty, NAT'L L. J., Mac 2, 1992, at 18. Other early coverage included Daniel J . Winruke, Credzt Lyonnaz�:,An Aberra tion or m;, Enhancemen t  of Creditors' Rights in Delaware?, 6 INSIGHTS, jULY 1992, at 31, Footnote of the Year Has Lawyers Wondering About the Zone of Insolvency, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 388 (1992). 
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There are two responses. First, as noted above, these cases are expressive 
and experimental. While I think the courts in these decisions arc I rving to tell us 
something, they are also trying to sort out some very complex and d i fficu l t  problems 
involving, among other things, the developing relationship between priority, duty 
and contract. If you want to muse i n  a public way, wi thou t  necessarily creating too 
great a stir, this may be the way to do it.219 Second, as a practical matter, these 
opinions have doubtless been available to the audience tha t ca res. I n  part, this is true 
simply because the more recent ones appear onl ine in u noffici al  versions. It is also 
due in part to the fact that the Delaware bar is a tightly -kn it community that appears 
to have a fairly good handle on what its Chancellors and Su preme Court Justices are 
doing.220 
It would be difficult to "prove" that these cases are " expressive." But given 
their puzzles and contours, I believe that is the best way to u nderstand them. This, 
however, leads to a more basic question: If they are expressive, what is Delaware 
saying to us about directors' duties to creditors? 
B. What Are They Trying to Tell us? 
We can see at least four themes in the cases from Credit Lttonnai� forward: (i) 
directors should have a wide zone of ex ante discretion when a fi;m is distressed; (ii) 
narrati�es of extreme behavior will describe the boundaries of acceptable conduct 
regard�ng corpo:ate �reditors; (iii) contract and other existing cred i tors' rights and 
remed�es - not fiduCJary duty - should almost always d eterm i ne ex po�l disputes; 
�nd (I�) the De_
Iaware courts themselves have an i m porta n t  educative and 
mshtuhonal role m generating these themes. While these a re not the only stor
ies 
these cases tell, they help solve the puzzles they create. 
1· The Real Zone - Director Discretion 
Scores of articles on directors' duties to credi tors circle around the pec
u liar 
problems posed by the " " f · the zone o msolvency.221 But perhaps we' ve focused on 
wrong zone. It may not be a z f . . 
. d 1· ..,.,;t 
b . 
one 0 econonuc condition these courts wtsh to e ll•u ' 
d
�t rather a zo
d
ne of drrec�orial discretion they wish to dilate . If so, i t  is not unlimited 
tscretion, an may requrre dir t . · usly 
th ·f h . 
ec ors to cons1der creditors' interests more seno 
an I t ey were acting solely for the benefit of shareholders. 
219 Of course, if this is so it h · 11 the controversy Credit Lyonnais subse ' 1 may ave backfired on Chancellor Allen, g1v
e 
uo 5 R , quent Y generated ee OCK, supra note 213 t 101 , · orate governance-the senior mana ers an'd 
a . 3 ( The subjects of the study of U.S. corpd the 
lawyers who advise them- fo� 
�t�ectors of large, publicly held corporations, an 
221 Indeed, as noted in �
urpnsmgly small and close-knit community."). hOle 
symposium issue of a law review h:s 
�uthor's �ootnote at the outset of this article, a �li ht 
m the Zone of Insolvency, J. Bus. TECH L 
een dedtc�ted to the question. See Sympos1um, Tzv g 
· · (forthcommg 2007). 
t 
a 
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Consider first Credit Lyonnais. Recall that some of the most influential aspects 
of the opinion appear in �ts famous footnote 55, where Chancellor Allen explored the 
presumed effects that drstress would have on directors' willingness to undertake 
risk.222 If directors were able to conceive of the distressed firm as an "entity" - rather 
than as, for example, a nexus of priority-determined claims and assets - then they 
might be able to act for the best interests of all: 
' 
Such directors will recognize that in managing the business affairs of 
a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances 
may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to 
follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the 
stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group 
interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity 
to act.223 
Directors of the distressed firm should, in short, have the discretion to act as 
they see fit to attempt to solve the firm's troubles. By a parity of reasoning, this 
means that they would no longer be compelled to maximize firm value for 
shareholders. Thus, Credit Lyonnais may be seen as a caveat to cases like Katz v. Oak 
Industries, which seem to encourage high-risk behavior.224 This might benefit 
shareholders in some cases; it might benefit creditors in others. But it would create 
deliberative space for directors that did not necessarily exist before that time. 
What should directors do in these deliberations? Perhaps, if they take 
Chancellor Allen's approach literally, undertake something resembling the risk 
analysis posed in his hypothetical. The inquiry would thus no longer be one solely of 
value maximization for shareholders, but of the broader consequences for all 
corporate constituents, especially creditors whose interests might be affected by a 
particularly risky course of action. Perhaps more important, it would give directors 
222 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 12150, 
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
223 !d. 
m Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citations omitted). As that court explained: . . . . 
It is the obligation of directors to atte�p!, withm the Ia":, to maximize the 
long-run interests of the corpora�on s stockholders, that . they may 
sometimes do so "at the expense of others (even .assummg that a 
transaction which one may refuse to enter into ca� meamngfully be said to 
be a t  his expense) does not for that reason constitut� a breach of d�ty .. It 
seems likely that corporate restructunngs designed to maxmuze 
shareholder values may in some instances ha':e the effect of requmn.
g 
bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus m effect transfer economic 
value from bondholders to stockholders. 
Similar sentiments are expressed in, e.g., U.S. v. Jolly, 1 02 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303-04 (Del. 1988) . 
I '  
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the rhetoric and the ability to neutralize (or at least ignore) excessive demands from 
any particular constituency. Directors of the distressed firm would not be acting as 
liquidators, as envisioned by the trust fund cases, but workou t experts, negotiating 
the firm's future comparatively unconstrained by rigid application of d u ty doctrine. 
This zone of discretion may, in Vice Chancellor Strine's terms, have been the true 
"spirit" of Credit Lyonnais.215 
The cases following Credit Lyonnais - Production Resou rccs, Trc11ll'ick, and 
Gheewalla- make this explicit. As noted above, these cases constrained Credit 
Lyonnais by aggressively subjecting creditor claims of breach of duty to classic 
director defenses, such as the business judgment rule and excu lpatory charter 
clauses. The expressive inference from these instrumental results is that directors 
should be at least as free from creditor attacks as they would be from shareholder 
attacks (and perhaps more so). If, as Production Resources suggests, " a nimus" is the 
fault line, the zone of discretion is quite broad . 
Gheewalla explicitly wants to recognize a " zone" of dirl'ctor discretion, 
although the footprint may be considerably larger than was contemplated by Credit 
Lyonnais.226 Recall that here, Vice Chancellor Noble believed that creditors should be 
permitted to assert derivative (but not direct) claims against d i rectors, because if the 
firm were insolvent, they would have the proper incentives to enforce directorial 
duty, having stepped into " the shoes normally occupied by the shareholders- that 
of residual risk-bearers."227 
Thi� ex
_
ception for creditors in these limited circumstances argu ably 
man:tams the delicate balance achieved by the stand ing 
reqmrements for pursuit of derivative actions outside of this 
context - i.e., bal�cing the " Delaware prerogative that directors 
manage the affarrs of a corporation with the realization that 
sharehold�r policin?, via derivative actions, is a necessary check on 
the behav10r of drrectors that serve in a fiduciary capacity to 
shareholders.22B 
Fully im�lementing the priority-based logic of the d irectors' duty cases 
would doubtless mterfere with the "balance" s rt. th . h. e Better to 
h d "  . 
uppo mg ts preroga v . 
say t at trectors have duties to creditors when the firm is insolvent, than actually to 
225 See Prod. Res. Group L L c v Ncr G Ch 2004) (stating that the "spirit" of Cr d -t . L. . . . roup, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (
Del. . ted 
directors who in good faith u��e a 
yonn�zs was �at the business judgment rule prot�on 
of corporate debt obligation£. 
ess nsky busmess strategy in order to insure sahsfa 
226 N. Am. Catholic Educ Progr · 971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1 ,  2006). For a detailed descri �mnung Found. v. Gheewalla, 2006 WL 2588 227 Gheewalla, 2006 WL 2588971p o� of Gheewalla, see supra Part I.C.3. 22s Id (
" 
, at 12. 
. mternal footnotes omitted). 
d 
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hold them liable for their breach. Exhortation preserves a zone of discretion that 
liability would constrict. 
If d iscretion is part of the story the directors' duties cases want to tell, we 
then have another question: How, if at all, does this discretion differ from that 
created by operation of the business judgment rule? At least superficially, it doesn't, 
which may be why some writers end their analyses of these cases here.229 The 
problem is that once we are dealing with creditors, the mix of norms, values and 
rules is much more complex and volatile than when we deal with shareholders. We 
know this is true because, as discussed further below, like it or not, the Delaware 
courts appear unwilling to limit their analyses of directors' duties to creditors to 
questions of business judgment. Rather, we find these cases performing other 
important expressive functions. 
2. Narratives about Outliers- Saints and Sinners 
Another expressive function these cases perform is, as noted above, to tell us 
about the boundaries of directorial behavior in the face of financial distress ­
behavior that is, by definition, outside the zone of discretion. Here, we return to 
Professor Rock's analysis of the " saints and sinners" who populated the case law 
that developed Delaware's jurisprudence on management buyouts.230 
Like the MBO cases Professor Rock considered, the Delaware courts have 
used directors' duties cases to criticize exceedingly bad behavior that, in these cases, 
might harm creditors. Production Resources seems to be a good example of this.231 
Recall that here the debtor corporation took extraordinary steps to evade a legitimate 
money judgment against it. Salkind, the "sinner" in this story, had liens on all of the 
corporation's assets, as well as notes and warrants convertible into stock that would 
apparently have given her not merely control of the corporation but " more shares of 
NCT than are currently outstanding."232 There was, according to Vice Chancellor 
Strine, " a pattern of improper self-enrichment" by those in control and loyal to 
Salkind. And, even though NCT was indebted to Salkind, her alleged capital 
infusions were " often put into the coffers of NCT subsidiaries precisely to frustrate 
the ability of [creditor] PRG to collect on its debt due it from NCT."233 This amounted 
to a "marked degree of animus towards a particular creditor,"234 a kind of bad faith 
229 See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 34-46; Rib�tein & Alces, sup:a n?te 197, at 4 "("The legal  quandary of who should be owed duties in the msolvency scenano disappears . . .  m the 
face of the business judgment rule") .  
230 See Rock, supra note 213. 
231 See generally Prod. Res. Group� L.L.C. v. NCT Grou
p, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 
2004). For a detailed discussion of Productzon Resources, see supra Part I .C.l.  
232 ld. at 781 .  
233 ld. 
234 Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 798. 
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that would simply be outside the bounds of acceptable corporate governance norms, 
at least vis-a-vis creditors. 
But directors and other insiders are not the only sinners in these cases. 
Sometimes, those taken to task are the plaintiff-creditors, or, by implication their 
counsel. The complaint in Trenwick, for example, alleged l ack of directorial diligence 
"by conclusory insult, not by fact pleading." 235 The complaint was, Vice Chancellor 
Strine observed, "entirely devoid of facts indicating that the board did not engage in 
an appropriate process of diligence . . . . "2.16 In Ghcewa/la, Vice Cha ncellor Noble 
noted that a true understanding of the complaint was possible only if it was "shorn 
of excess verbiage."237 Nor should we forget our old friend Parretti, the controlling 
shareholder in Credit Lyonnais whose machinations first gave Chancellor Allen the 
opportunity to start this entire discussion.238 
Judges may not like to think of themselves as sermonizing. CoHfm Rock, they 
may rather view themselves as "policemen" than "preachers . "2..W Yet in an equitable 
court, such as Delaware Chancery, the particulars of behavior surely influence 
judicial review. Moreover, this sermonizing may be an expressive response to the 
unstable and transitional nature of our thinking about directors' duties to creditors. 
As discussed in Parts I and II, above, we know we have a conceptual model on 
which directors' duties to creditors rests - priority in right of payment.  Yet, we also 
know that we do not like many of the implications of this model. 
One of Rock's key insights about the role of Delaware courts in resolving 
disputes emanating from the wave of MBOs in the 1980s was that they will  use the 
narrative form, which is necessarily expressive, to generate norms whe� things are in 
�ux.240 In the case of duties to creditors, the decisions may be no more hortatory �an 
m other . contexts, bu.
t the exhortation plays a special role: It is helping to define 
boundanes of behavior that the "rules" can't. Delaware courts mav want to ta
lk 
a
.
�ut the saints and sinners
.
here because the "canon," so to speak, h�s not yet been 
brushed. Indeed, they are usmg these stories to write it. 
: 
J
J.enwick Am. Litig. Trust, 906 A.2d at 173. 
: Gheew�l/a, 20?6 W� 2588971 at • 18. . 
would seemS�af��:rsllDu�fr supra �ote 5, �t 1224 n.1 63 ("Read ing between the Jines, It 
239 5 R 
ce or en was nghtly disgusted with Parretti's behavior."). ee ock, supra note 213 at 1016 ("M . . . . uch closer to understanding the role of co rts . ' .Y mtmhon IS that we come m than as policemen."). 
u m corporate law If we think of judges more as preachers 
240 Id. at 1019 ("Because MBOs f . . . . ddenlY assumed prominence in the 1980 th 0 .  Sigruficant publicly held compames su ware corporate Jaw in action· the d 
s
, 1 
ey proVIde a case study in which we can watch Delad the communication of those.standa��� �P�6e.nt and. articulation of standards of conduct 
an 
0 0 cers, directors, and lawyers." ). 
d 
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3. The Role of Contract 
271 
� i m�ortant theme in the post-Credit Lyonnais cases explores the role of 
contract m sorting out breach of duty claims. In Production Resources, Vice Chancellor 
Strine recognized �e force of contract, noting that " [c]reditors are often protected by 
strong covenants, hens on assets and other negotiated contractual protections."241 
This view was soon echoed by Gheewalla, which went one step further to note that 
creditors' many protections " at law" should generally preclude breach of duty 
claims: 242 
" Indeed it would appear that creditors' existing protections - among 
which are the protections afforded by their negotiated agreements, 
their security instruments, the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, fraudulent conveyance law, and bankruptcy law ­
render the imposition of an additional, unique layer of protection 
though direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary."243 
In fairness, it is not clear that the "layer of protection" for creditors is so 
much " unique" as different. After all, shareholders can and do contract for 
protection all the time. Moreover, Delaware law gives them a variety of rights vis-a­
vis the corporation and its d irectors that creditors would not have, including, for 
example, the right to vote for directors in the first place.244 Nevertheless, there is 
something to be said for the intuition behind this view. We typically view equity - of 
which fiduciary duty is a species - as a sort of judicial last resort, a remedy when 
rights "at law" (contract or statute) fail. To be sure, the mere legality of a contract or 
other similar device (charter, bylaw) will not, of itself, assure that it passes judicial 
muster.245 But it should at minimum create a strong presumption that equity will not 
later interfere. 
Of course, as with the zone of discretion, there are limits to the force of 
contract or other rights "at law." Production Resources is a good example of this. The 
plaintiff-creditors could have negotiated for any number of contractual creditor 
protections, including liens on the debtor's assets. The failure of those contractual 
mechanisms would lead to other remedies, including, most importantly, the right to 
seize those assets, or their value, even if the debtor went into bankruptcy. Yet, Vice 
241 Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 790. 
242 Gheewa/la, 2006 WL 2588971 at *13 ("Creditors are often ,,Protected by strong 
covenants, liens on assets, and other negotiated contractual protecnons. ) (quotmg Prod. Res., 
863 A.2d at 790). 
243 ld. 
244 DEL CODE ANN tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2007). 
• 
245 Sc�ell v. Chri�-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 �?d 437, 439 (Del. 1?,7_1 ) (" . . .  in�quitable 
action does not become permissible simply because 1t IS legally possible. ), see also Stnne, supra 
note 10. 
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Chancellor Strine tells us the directors' " marked degree of anim
us"24" permitted ­
perhaps required - a  different analysis. Mrs. Salkind's beha v ior was so nakedly 
vexatious to one creditor, and so outside the bounds of general l y  acce
pted 
commercial conduct, that the Vice Chancellor saw a role for equ ity. 
The role of contract here, as elsewhere, leaves at  least two classes of 
questions. First, is Production Resources really about outrageous cond uct ,  or is it about 
contract? If the former, it should give directors a wide zone o f  discretion, bounded 
only by behavior analogous to that of "sinner" Salkind . I f  the lat tL'r, it should 
constrict that discretion to ward off the "opportunism" that concerned Chancellor 
Allen in Credit Lyonnais. As with so many other problems of p rivate ordering, what 
we can know about today's rules depends on having some meanin giu l sense of the 
boundaries of contract. 
Second, if the contractual boundary is " opportunism," what does that mean? 
How bad would a directorial decision have to be vis-a-vis cred itors to warrant 
judicial scrutiny? Recall, for example, Chancellor Allen's footnote i n  Credit Lyonnais 
about the "profligate" nature of leveraged buyouts in the 1 980s."47 A l though the 
" profligacy" of these transactions was not the articulated basis for the decision, the 
fact that it is mentioned suggests it might have mattered to Chancel lor A llen. 
If opportunism is the concern, some current transactions m ight give us 
pause. Consider first the wave of private equity buyouts.2-lll A recent series in the 
W�ll S�reet Journal 
_
o�served that since 2003, companies have borrowed $69 billi�n 
pnma�ly to_ 
pay div��:nds to p�vate-equity owners, as compared to $1 0 b�llion ii1 
the pnor SIX �ears
_
. In certam cases, these companies have been dnven to 
bankruptcy or �ts brink by these borrowings.2.50 While these companies are forced to 
renege on retiree p�yments, they nevertheless make large fee and dividend 
payments to the pnvate equity firms that own them.251 Is this the sort of 
246 Prod._ Res. Group, L.L.C. v. N cr  Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772 798 (Del .  Ch. 2004)· 247 Credit Lyormais Bank N d 1 ' 
' -o 1991 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *8 el 
e er and, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 12;,:J , . al" 
of profligate nature of LBO
(D · Ch. �ec. 30, 1 991) (where court viewed transactiOn as typiC 
248 
s occu_rnng at end of 1980s). See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Can p · t E . B . T Dec 24 2006. ("Court documents detail le al b 
nva
_ 
e quzty . uzld a Public Face 7 N.Y. JMES,_ finnl 
Cerberus of orchestratin 
_g rawls m which mvestors accuse [pnvate equity . 5 
accusations the firm denie� .'�
etive deals that transgressed legal and ethical boundane ' 
249 See Gregory Ip & Hermy 5e d 1 ..,. d , · N er Far Away, WALL. ST. J., Jul. 25, 2006 at A1· n er, n 1 o ay s Buyouts, Payday for Firms zs ev L ST. 
J ., Jart 5, 2006, at Cl. ("The ink 'had b�r�
enn� Sender, Take01Jer Artists Quel!c!J Tll zrst, WA�hen 
the new private-equity owners of s t l"
ly dned on the sale documents about a year ago . ron 
dividend financed with newly issu 
a
d
e
lnlt
te
1
operator lntelsat . . . paid themselves a $350 rni! J 
250 e e sat debt ") See lp & Sender, supra note 249 A
. . 
. . tion of Dade Behring, Inc. and distress of Int 1 t) ' 
at 14 (discussing bankruptcy reorgamza 
251 ld. 
e sa . 
d 
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�p�ortuz;ism that C�edit �yonnais would condemn? Or is it simply within the 
arumus -bounded d1seretion suggested by Production Resources? 
, . . 
�i�lar qu�stions
_ 
can be asked about asset securitization under special 
faCilitation acts, m particular Delaware's Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act 
(ABSFA).�2 An " as�et securitization" is generally defined as "the structured process 
whereby mterests m loans and other receivables are packaged, underwritten, and 
sold in the form of " asset backed" securities" typically to a "special purpose entity" 
(SPE) owned by the originator of the assets.253 Some allege that these transactions are 
simply sophisticated forms of judgment-proofing devices which would inevitably 
harm involuntary or unsophisticated creditors.254 They are, on this view, 
opportunism "in excelsis."
255 
Questions have long persisted about whether bankruptcy courts would 
respect such transactions.256 Delaware's statute is an attempt to ensure that courts 
will have no choice, providing in essence that a properly worded conveyance 
contract will be effective under Delaware law - no matter what.257 Because ABSFA 
252 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A (2004). Other states have similar facilitation 
statutes, although none is quite as robust as Delaware's. See Alabama, ALA. CoDE § 35-10A-
2(a)(1 )  (2004); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 10:9-109(e) (2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 25-9A-1 02 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1 1 09.75 (2002); Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM. 
(ODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 2002). 
253 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, Assn 
SECURITIZATION: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK (1997), available at 
http:/ / www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/SS.HTM. See also TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: 
STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL AssET POOLS, AND AssET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 
1995); STEVEN L. ScHWARCZ, STRUOURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINOPLES OF Assn 
SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002). . . . . 
254 See, e.g., Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Lzabzlzty, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 92 (1996) (argumg 
that securitization is a method of judgment proofing). Compare Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1 999), and _Charles W. Mooney, Jr., II Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Szde of Tort Lzabzlz ty, 52 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1999), with Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable LogJC of ]udgm_en t Proofing: a Rep!Y I? Professor 1 Schwarcz,.J¢: STAN. L. REV. 55 (1999) (debating judgme�t-proofing effect of secuntlzatwn): . .  
I advert here to Professor Gilmore's observation about the development of negotiability 
doctrine which, in many respects, can be seen as the forerunner of securitization. See Grant Gilmore, 
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 461 (1979). 
256 In In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001), the bankruptcy 
court held on a motion for use of cash collateral that property purportedly sold in a 
securitization would nevertheless be available for use by the debtor's estate. Id. at 285 ("To 
suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in prod':lcts . �at it creates with its own 
labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, IS dJfficult to accept. . . . [T]here 
:><'ems to be an element of sophistry to sugges� that Debtor does _not retam at l
e�st an equztable 
mterest" in the cash collateral.). I collect and discuss these cases m Secrets and Lzens, supra note 
153, at 467-74 
"157 A
.
BSFA provides, "[n]otwithstanding any oth_er provi
si_o!' o� law," any_ 
pr�perty 
purported in the transaction documents to be transferred m a secuntizat10n transaction shall 
be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the transferor." DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 
6, §§ 2701A-2703A (2004). 
. \  
' I  ' ; I  
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applies to " [a]ny property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in 
part,"258 I have observed elsewhere that ABSFA would insulate intentional 
fraudulent transfers from judicial scrutiny.259 If this statute insulates all securitization 
contracts under Delaware law from judicial scrutiny, what sort of oppmtunism can 
we expect to see from the directors of distressed firms engaged in such transactions? 
4. The Role of Courts - The Educative Function of Directors' Duties 
to Creditors 
A fourth expressive theme in these cases involves not s tn tenwn ts nbout the 
parties or their relations (contractual or otherwise), but instead about the courts, 
themselves, and the role they play in generating norms i n  th is context. These cases 
are, in a sense, about the educative function that the Delaware cou rts believe they 
should play in the puzzling world of directors' duties to cred itors. 
(a) The Educative Function of Law 
That law may have an educative function is well known, and analytically 
similar to the claim that it has an expressive function.2oo Christopher Eisgruber has 
famously explored the widely-made but under-theorized, claim that the United 
States Supreme Court is an educative institution.261 He wond ered how this could be 
if the Court is not exp�rt in pedagogy or "complex arguments l ike those that inte
rest 
people who study philosophy professionally."262 He concluded tha t the Court does 
ed��ate:, 
but not
_ 
in traditional ways. It educates in its " inspirational" capacity/63 its 
�blltty to mohva_
te people to act ethically, a capacity that may be entirely 
mdependent of philosophical expertise."264 The Court d oes this in i mportant cases 
258 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(l). 
259 Secrets and Liens, supra note 153, at 470. Needless to sa there are many doctrinal 
�;:s a court could make to evade the force of ABSFA, some ot'which I discuss id. at 470 
260 Christopher L Eisgruber J th s , , , N y U L REV. 961 (1992). ' s e upreme Court an Educatzve Inst ztutwn 7, 67 
· · · · 
261 Jd at 962 nn 1 2· E · 66 
HARV. L REV.-193, 208 (1952)' 
5ug�ne V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Revzeu>, 26 
(1962) (quotin Rostow 
·th ee a so ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
(quoting Rostgw with a Wlrov�r�; 
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 249 (1�� 
PoLmCAL DISCOURSE 94-�f (1991) ('Th y A: <?LE�OON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERJSHM
ENTblic 
about the American versio 
e oprruon m the DeShaney case miseducates the pu G 
REVOLUTIONARY 136 (1987) Q 
�- -0i �e . welfare state."); RALPH LERNER, THE THIN
� 
modes of thought lying be���
a or:ruons should "transfer to the minds of the citizens the 
regime"); M!GIAEL J. PERRY THE C��S 
anguage and the notions of right fundamental to �n�� 
(quoting Rostow)· Robin West F TITUTION, mE CoURrs, AND HUMAN R.Icms 112-13 (l':11)Qj (1990) (commen�g upon "the �or�rd: Taking Freedom Seriously, 1 04 HARV. L. REV . 43, 1 
262 Eisgruber, supra note 2��
a
at
v;6�ol
e of Supreme Court opinions") .  
263 I d. at 964. ' · 
264 I d. at 967. 
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like West Virginia v. Barnette265 and Cohen v. California266 by making what he calls " ad 
hominem" arguments, arguments about group identity.267 
The major Delaware opinions on directors' duties to creditors may perform 
an analogous function. While ethical action may not be a core expressed concern of 
the Delaware courts, proper behavior by corporate actors is. Cases from Credit 
Lyonnais through Gheewalla may be attempts by the Delaware courts to educate the 
corporate community -and perhaps other courts that would apply Delaware law -
about behavior that is and is not acceptable when a firm is in distress. Moreover, 
there is literally an ad hominem quality to these opinions. As noted above, the 
"sinners" - Parretti, in Credit Lyonnais, Salkind, in Production Resources, perhaps the 
plaintiffs in Trenwick or Gheewalla - and their "sins" are heavily criticized. Perhaps 
part of the pedagogy of these opinions is to instruct by negative example. 
We can take the educative analogy a step further by considering certain 
rhetorical features of the opinions. All of the major Delaware opinions rely heavily 
on two stereotypical educational devices: The hypothetical and the footnote. Credit 
Lyonnais uses both, setting forth in its "famous footnote" 55268 a detailed hypothetical 
discussion of the "curious things" that "the possibility of insolvency can do."269 As 
discussed above, this hypothetical sets up a simple probability model to assess the 
risks imposed by various investment (or litigation) decisions. By using an 
exceedingly simple model - a single reward with measurable risks - Chancellor 
Allen teaches us that the investment choice made by directors will affect not only 
265 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Barnette struck a rule requiring recitation of the pledge of 
allegiance. It is famous for Justice Jackson's stirring rhetoric about government's right to 
control speech and, by implication, thought: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe wha� �hall be ortho�ox m pohtJcs, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opm10n or force c1t1zens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein . . . .  Under the First Amendment the 
government must leave to the people the eval.uation of ideas. Bald or subtle, 
an idea is as powerful as the audience allows 1t to be. . , . , 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Yet, as Lessig has observed, the case IS an oddity because 
"[g]ovemment has always and everywhere advanced the orthodox by rewardmg the believers 
and by segregating or punishirlg the heretics." See Soczal Mean.zng, supra note 13, at 946. It 1s 
curious that one case, Barnette, can be viewed as both educahve and as confhctmg wzth the 
government's power to educate. . 
266 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (stating that a person could not be convicted for wearing Jacket 
bearing expletives on it in a courthouse consistent with. 
Fust or Fourteenth Amend ment; 
noting that he is entitled to public displays that do r:ot.spe�lfically b
reach the peace). 
. 
. . 
267 Eisgruber, supra note 260, at 972 ("a d1st��1shmg trait of good teachers IS an 
ab1hty to deploy ad hominem arguments to good effect. ). . , . . . 
268 Thi g others y1·ce Chancellor Stnne s charactenzatwn of Credit  s was, amon , 
Lyonnais ' footnote 55. See Prod. Res. Group, L.LC. v. NCf Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
i69 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe .com�c'ns. Corp., No. 12150, 1 991 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-09 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). See d1scusswn supra note 212. 
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shareholders (presumptively the sole beneficiaries of director action when the firm is 
solvent) but also the "entire community of interests"270 by virtue of the priority-duty 
model. 
He may also be teaching us something about the simplifying assumptions 
that are acceptable to make, and perhaps the uti l ity and propriety of  using such 
assumptions. Recall that the hypothetical imagines directors facing three choices­
high, medium and low risk-with corresponding payouts. His hypothetical assumes 
that creditors would prefer a low-risk decision, presuming that cred i tors are more 
conservative than shareholders (and, on a conventional view of the priority-duty 
model, would be paid first from the proceeds of the low-ri sk settlement). This 
suggests that it is appropriate to infer something about claimants' risk preferences 
from their place in the priority pecking order. Perhaps Chancellor Allen is teaching 
us that his model is not merely a convenient heuristic, but a lso a barometer for 
predicting investors' distinct, sometimes competing, aspirations for f irm investment 
decisions. 
Vice Chancellor Strine's Production Resources opinion also relies heavily on 
footnotes and, to a lesser extent, hypotheticals, although he would appear less 
inclined to draw inferences about risk preference from the priority-duty model. He 
acknowledges the temptation to "posit extreme hypotheticals involv ing directors 
putting cash in slot machines,"271 but resists because " the real world i s  more likely to 
generate situations when directors face a difficult choice between pursuit of a 
plausible, but risky, business strategy that might increase the firm's value to the level 
that_ equity holders w� receive value, and another course guaranteeing no return for 
eq�1ty but preservabon of value for creditors."272 Strine rejects this use of the 
pnon�-duty model because the "reality [is] that creditors are not monolithic and 
t�at differe�t classes of
_ 
cr�ditors might have risk preferences that are greatly 
disparate, w1th some havmg mterests more like stockholders."273 
_But_ 
the Vice Chancellor 
_
cannot entirely resist the temptation to hypothesi�e. 
In considermg whether the plamtiffs had asserted a direct- not derivative -claHn agains� NCT's directors, Vice Chancellor Strine stated that the allegation " can be analogized to a more general example" : 
270 ld. at *108-09. 
271 As Professor Barondes obse thi h s it is the subject of at least one re orted . r_v
es, s ypothetical m ay not be so extreme, a left 
to the imagination). See Bar!nd deasion (the expressive implications of which are be
st 
Tri­
State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2, ;;�(�!�� n� 46, at 8 n.21 (?iscussing Dwyer v. Jones (!nl r� the 
debtor's funds in Las Vegas "to . 
r. .D. Pa. 1982), mvolving officers who gam� ebt r's 
creditors.;� The strategy failed. See i;�� 4��}ugh money . . . to pay the corporate- e 0 
273 Pro_d . . Res., 863 A.2d at 790 n.57. · Th1s IS, I note, a point Strin k . .d t 789 n.56. e rna es m one of his lengthy footnotes. See z · a 
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Suppose that the directors of an insolvent firm do not undertake 
conduct that lowers the value of the firm overall, or of creditors in 
gen�ral, but �stead take action that frustrates the ability of a 
particular creditor to recover, to the benefit of the remainder of the 
corporation's creditors and of its employees. Could this conceivably 
be a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties to the particular injured 
creditor and, if so, under what circumstances? Would that creditor 
have to show that the directors did not rationally believe that their 
actions (e.g., in trying to maintain the operations of the firm) would 
eventually result in the creation of value that would enable payment 
of the particular creditor's claim? To at least my mind, there are a 
myriad of policy considerations that would arise by the indulgence 
or non-indulgence of a fiduciary duty claim of this type and I am 
reluctant to ponder their viability without better help from briefing 
by adversarial parties.274 
277 
Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that at this stage he could resolve the 
motion to dismiss "without making any broad pronouncements that would have 
large policy implications."275 In doing so he offered what sounds like a somewhat 
modest experimental view, denying the motion to dismiss the direct claims " on the 
established principle that when a firm is insolvent, the directors take on a fiduciary 
relationship to the company's creditors, combining that principle with the 
conservative assumption that there might, possibly exist circumstances in which the 
directors display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular creditor with 
a proven entitlement to payment that they expose themselves to a direct fiduciary 
duty claim by that creditor."276 Like a good educator, the Vice Chancellor " solves" 
the hypothetical by applying well-established ("conservative") principles to convey 
an instructive warning about where liability might arise. 
(b) The Educational Role of Delaware Courts 
While the Delaware directors' duties opinions may be expressive, generally, 
and even educative, we still face a question: Why Delaware? Recall that one of the 
two basic puzzles in these cases asks why the major cases 
. 
invo!ve s� mu�h 
discussion. A corollary would ask, Why these courts? �fter 
,
al!, If �enous fman�Jal  
distress typically results in a bankruptcy case, then creditors fiduciary duty claims 
274 Id. at 797-98. · 
f h p d · 27s Jd. at 798. The tail of t.'-Js quote bespeaks the express1;e nature o t e ro uctwn Resources opinion. Vice Chancellor Strine implies that plam�1ff� ,counsel fell short by not 
providing "better adversarial briefing." Id. But, if th� pla1�tlff s goal was to collect a 
contractua l  debt- and contract begins and ends the d1scusswn-what exactly were they 
supposed to say? 
27& Id. 
I 
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will, in the first instance, be sorted out by a United States Bankru ptcy Court.277 If 
Bankruptcy Courts are more likely than state (in particular, Delaware) courts to face 
these questions, what does Delaware think it has to add? 
Perhaps the answer is that Delaware courts view themselves as especially -
perhaps uniquely - adept at developing and teaching fid u ciary jurisprudence. The 
lessons they would be teaching us have both substantive featu res - on director 
discretion, contract, and so forth - as well as on the role of the court i tself. Here, we 
can infer at least two expressive/ educative aspirations. 
The first involves the reflexive nature of equ ity ju rispru dence. Equity 
typically involves a greater judicial intervention than we expect when courts act at 
"at law," e.g., in upholding a contract. The Delaware courts generally view 
themselves as parsimonious in the development of equity, both for philosophical 
and practical reasons.278 In part, this should be so that these courts can reserve to 
themselves the power and flexibility to craft rules and standards i n  the future. 
Recall, for example, Chief Justice Veasey's dissent in Onnr icarc. A mong the 
things that distressed him was the majority's conversion o f  an equ itable option into a 
per-se rule (and perhaps an ill-advised one, at that). The " beauty of the Delaware 
corporation law," was that it created a " framework . . .  based on an enabling statute 
with the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court apply ing princip les of fiduciary 
duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case basis."279 The " bright-line, per se" ban 
that the Court had enacted was, in his words, a "judicially-created 'third rail' that · · · 
(became] one of the given 'rules of the game' . . . . " 21lo Applied more generally, the 
Delaware courts might be forgiven for wanting to reserve to themselves the power to 
develop and teach these fiduciary principles, even in the context of d irector-creditor 
disputes. 
Second, this would be consistent with market-based views of law as a 
" p�oduct." Perhaps the Delaware courts are taking seriously Professor Romano
's 
claim t�at law is th�r product and that they must protect this franchise from 
competmg prod�cers. 1 In this context, those other pro ducers necessarily - perha
ps 
appropnately - mclude United States Bankruptcy Courts, over which Delawar
e 
courts have only indirect influence, at best. The Delaware courts may be concern
ed 
l'ti . m O
f course, these courts may elect to permit the parties to carry on a fiduciary du� ;6�(��)I.n state court. See, e.g., Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v . Ernst & Young L.L.P., 906 A.Z 
court's a��i 
Se� Strine, supra _note 10, at 904 ("Unlike a legislature or regulatory .  
age�cy, a 
279 ty�xpand Its wmdow on the world IS ethically and practically constramed 
) . C J 
dissenting). 
care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A .2d 914, at 939 (Veasey, . .  
280 Id. 281 See Roberta Rom La p . · p le 1 
J.L. 
ECON. & ORe. 225 (1985). 
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that federal bankruptcy law will erode their preeminence in corporate governance as 
have the federal securities laws under, for example, Sarbanes-Oxley.2B2 
And perhaps they would be right to be concerned. As " this nation's 
arguably most important business court,"283 they may well have developed a better 
sense of duty and norms in matters of corporate governance than any other single set 
of courts. Bankruptcy courts, by contrast, may be well versed in matters of priority 
and claims and contract, but fiduciary duty is not thought to be the specialty of 
bankruptcy judges. Thus, in the competition over who gets to establish corporate 
norms vis-a-vis creditors, Delaware courts may literally want their institutional 
voices - and their institutional choices -to dominate fiduciary discourse that might 
otherwise be generated by bankruptcy courts . .  
IV. What Remains Unsaid- Gaps and Opportunities 
The doctrinal maneuvers of the post-Credit Lyonnais era may have given us 
important rhetoric that can be explained as expressive attempts to define and control 
developing corporate governance norms when a firm is in distress. But, these cases 
may also have instrumental consequences. In certain cases, these decisions may 
create unintended, or unacceptable, gaps in creditors' ability to sue directors of the 
distressed firm. In this section, I mention three, and then describe how the better 
expressive features of the Delaware cases nevertheless create opportunities to fill 
these gaps in normatively acceptable ways. 
A. Direct v. Derivative Standing 
The post-Credit Lyonnais case law is especially confusing on the question of 
standing. First introduced by Vice Chancellor Strine in Production Resources, the net 
effect of the analysis seems to be that, except for outlier cases ("animus"), creditors 
will have only derivative, not direct, standing under Delaware law.284 This creates 
troubling gaps, as it appears to misapply Delaware's  own law on the distinction 
282 See Leo E Strine Jr. The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the 
Challenges We (and Europe) 'Fac�, 30 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 673, 685 (2005) ("What will be mo.re 
troubling [than Sarbanes-Oxley] is if the federal govemmen,
: contmues I? v�er out of Its 
tr�ditional lane in the American corporate gove,:
nance system. ). A re�ent, Iromc exa�ple of 
this competition occurred in the murky field of deepemng msolvency, a cause of �chon t�at 
appears to overlap with a claim that directors breached fiduoary dulles to creditors. Five 
months after the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Del�ware held that Delawar� law would 
recognize such a cause of action, Vice Chancellor Stnne Issued the Tre�wrck decision - which, 
an:ong other things, held that Delaware does not. Compare OHC LiqUJdatJon Trust v. Credit 
SUisse First Bc�ton (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 531 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) wrth 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
283 See Strine supra note 10, at 878. 
284 Prod. Res: Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004) . 
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between direct and derivative suits, and fails to account fo
r the way bankruptcy law 
generally works in thls context. 
First, Delaware's current test for whether a claim is direct or derivativ
e, 
Tooley, teaches that the distinction " must be based solely on the following question
s: 
Who suffered the alleged harm - the corporation or the suing stock
holder 
individually - and who would receive the benefit o f  the recovery or other 
remedy?"'2B5 In Gheewalla, Vice Chancellor Noble offered an elaborate discussion 
why creditors should not, as a practical matter, have standing to bring direct claims 
against directors -even though they would otherwise have " stepped into 
shareholders' shoes." "[D]irect claims by creditors w ould not help the corporate 
collective," he reasoned, "because the benefit would accrue to the cred i tor bringing 
the direct claim."286 
This is doubtless true. But by ignoring the first part of the Ton ley test - who 
was harmed? - he proves too much. Creditors are likely no di fferent from 
shareholders for this purpose: If we assume they are rational and greedy, they all 
want to recover individually, and none wants to share with others who may be 
similarly situated. Yet, it would seem that many untoward d i rectori<ll decisions can 
harm creditors directly - and not just the corporation. A d ecision not to pay certain 
creditors, or to undertake a very risky course of action, may well harm particular 
creditors without harming the corporate collective. This w ould certainly be direct 
harm; why should the recovery flow to the corporation rather than the victim? 287 
Sec�nd, it is well known that bankruptcy Jaw makes a strong distinction 
between cla1ms that belong to creditors versus those that belong to a bankruptcy 
estate: Under Caplzn v: Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., a bankruptcy trustee has no 
standmg to assert claims on behalf of an estate's creditors.2AA There, a bankruptcy 
trust
.
ee sued an inden�re trustee for failing to perform obligations on behalf of 
cred1tors under a trust mdenture. The United States Supreme Court conclu ded that a 
bankruptcy trustee had no standing to bring such claims because, among other 
285 T le D ld · 
286 N �� "cat�
n
� ��
n, L� & Jer:rrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1 031, 1035 (Del. 2004). •12 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006) . 
o 1C uc . rogramrrung Found. v. Gheewalla, 2006 WL 2588971 at 
287 Moreover, Vice Chancello N bl , · 1 rgely irrelevant if what we care ab t . 
r 0 e s ex post orientation- who collects ? - 15 a . st 
directors at all. In other wor�u �� 
th�;x ante incentive-effects of permitting suits dg��e 
incentive to enforce will likely b 
5' 1c� .f 
ancellor Noble may have it exactly backwar �-. ect 
suit), and not have to share (:s
g�ea e� 1 you. know you will collect for yourself (as in.� Jfary 
duties- or not- should be the 
m a envative one). The "incentive" to enforce � uo r a 
shareholder of a healthy one. 
same, whether you are a creditor of a distressed firm 0 
288 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972). 
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reasons, they simply were not causes of action that could have belonged to the 
debtor, and therefore its estate.289 
Caplin did not distinguish " direct" from " derivative" creditor claims, but the 
distinction would now appear to matter. By saying, as Gheewalla does, that creditors 
can effectively assert only derivative claims, we are left with a gap: Being derivative, 
they should in the first instance belong to the corporate debtor - not the creditors. 
But, being creditors' claims, they should, under Caplin, be assertable only by 
creditors. Thus, we have the potential for rights (or claims) without remedies: 
derivative breach of duty claims that can be asserted by neither creditors (Gheewalla) 
nor bankruptcy trustees (Caplin). 
Third, and related to the second, is the effect that rights of senior creditors 
must have on incentives to bring derivative creditor suits. Consider, for example, the 
all-assets security interest. If a senior creditor has a lien on all assets of a debtor, it 
would seem likely that that creditor -not the unsecured-creditor-plaintiffs - would 
have first priority in the derivative claim or its proceeds.290 If so, and 
notwithstanding Vice Chancellor Noble's Gheewalla analysis, what incentive would 
unsecured creditors have to bring such a claim? Why would they want to enrich the 
corporate debtor's bank? 
If the goal of Credit Lyonnais and its heirs is largely expressive, then perhaps 
cases like Gheewalla go too far. Putting to one side the problem noted above that 
much of its standing discussion is largely irrelevant, the decision - if given 
instrumental effect - tells directors that in fact they have no cause to worry about 
creditor suits, because neither creditors nor bankruptcy trustees can sue. Even if, in 
Vice Chancellor Noble's terms, creditors of the distressed corporation may have the 
" incentive" to sue, he has made it impossible for them to do so. How persuasive is 
judicial rhetoric if we know that it can never result in liability? 
. 
289 Jd. at 429 ("Nowhere does petitioner argue that [d�btor's estate] cou_ld make any 
clam• against [indenture trustee]. Indeed, the consp1cuous s1lence on th1s pomt IS a taot 
admission tha t  no such claim could be made."). 
290 The character of the derivative claim under Art!cle 9 of t�e Unifo� Comme�cia,! �ode (which would likely govern) is not entirely clear. It ��_ght be a commernal tort c_la1m, 
1f 1t is a claim sounding in tort. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13) (defin�tJOn of commemal tort cla1m). A 
close observer of the UCC would point out that � secunty mterest can only attach to a 
commercia l  tort claim if it is specified in some d�ta1l, after th� cla1m anses. ld. § 9-204(b)(2) 
(discussing attachment of "after-acquired" secun� �nterests m_ commemal tort cla1ms). Of 
course, directors and management might c_ut an ms1d� deal w1th the seruor secured lender 
after commencement of the derivative action, amendmg the secunty agreement to take a 
security interest in the derivative claims. Such a deal may be. st:uck, and n:ay m�ke us 
uncomfortabl f th me reasons as similar deals between JUmor and semor cla1mants e, or e sa 
d . p II A 2 concerned us in the railroad reorganizations discusse m art · · ' supra. 
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B. Exculpatory Charter Clauses 
I also question the propriety of subjecting creditors to exculpatory charter 
clauses authorized by, e.g., DGCL 102(b)(7). Recall that Production Resource
s explored 
this question, concluding that the "plain terms" of the statute subjected creditors
' 
breach of duty claims to such charter provisions.291 But this conclusion raises bot
h 
doctrinal and policy issues. 
As a doctrinal matter, I am not persuaded by this construction of § 102(b)(7). 
The statute specifically limits its purview to " the corporation or its stockholders." 
This presumably means that a charter can exculpate di rectors from liability for 
derivative and direct claims (that is, those held by the corporation or by 
shareholders).292 But the statute does not mention cred itors. If the Delaware 
legislature meant to include creditors, why did it not say so? One might infer under 
the exclusio unius principle that if Delaware wanted to inclu de credi tors, it knew how 
to do so.293 Nor is it satisfactory to say that creditors' derivative claims are impliedly 
exculpable, subsumed within the exculpation of all claims of "the corporation." As 
we have seen, courts like those in Gheewalla seem inclined to treat all creditor claims 
as derivative, even if they are more properly direct. 
Second, and perhaps more important, we justify the presence of an 
exculpatory clause in part by reference to notions of shareholder democracy.291 
Shareholders may lose their ability to recover from directors by virtue of such 
�lauses, but we tolerate that because, among other reasons, they eff�cti vely agree
d to 
It, and generall� retain the right to change it if they want to. Shareholders can 
:easonably be said t� have agreed to such provisions because they purchased sha
res 
Issued by a corporation whose charter had such a provision. Thev might even have 
voted to amend the charter to add an exculpatory charter clause. · 
We cannot say the same of creditors. Absent director and shareholder 
agreement: cred�tors have no right to vote for or a gainst charter amendmen
ts 
gene
.
rally, mcludmg those that would add an exculpatory charter c lau se.295 Nor is
tt 
credtble to say that creditors are deemed to have accepted an exculpatory chart
er 
: Prod. Res. Group� L.L.C. v. NCf Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 793 (Del .  Ch.  2004) .  DEL. �ODE ANN. bt. 8,  § 107(b)(l )  (2007). 
293 Constder for e 1 § 17 · · 1 f the decl b. £ d  . . d ' d  h
x�p e, 4, which provides that directors will be hab e or 1 ara on o tvt en s t at tmpa· ·t 1 "  · · th eVe1l 
of dissolution or insolven 
" 
D 
rr capt a to the. corporation, and to its credztors. m eWhen 
Delaware wants to sp�fy .ri. ht 
EL. �ODE AN�. tit. 8, § 1 74(a) (emphasis supphe.d).d s so 
explicitly. It is not clear wh 
g s an remedtes of creditors, in other words, tt. oe and 
remedies should be any difre���.
lpatory charter clause rules that would limit  these n ghts 
294 See Mary Siegel Fiduciary D ty M h . C p L 31/, 464 (2004) (noting controllin sha h rd yt s In Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. 
OR i �tor)' 
provision). g re 0 ers could, as shareholders, approve an ex
cu P 
295 Under DEL CODE ANN tit 8 § 24 (b . delete an exculpatory clause. Only sharehoide� h 2 . ), credttors have no power to add or ]ution adopted by directors "declann· g · t  ds . av� this power (following, I would note, a r
eSO 
' J s a  vtsabtlity."). 
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clause merely by
_
extendin? credit. I would be surprised if many factor the presence 
of such a clause mto len
_
dmg contracts. Nor could a lender realistically require any 
but the most desperate firms to eliminate such provisions as a condition to the loan. 
If one of the expressive lessons of Delaware's case law on directors' duties to 
creditors is that we should respect well-formed contracts, the absence of contract 
draws into question the application of exculpatory charter clauses to creditors. 
Shoul d  creditors be bound by a provision they did not plausibly choose or have a 
realistic opportunity to modify?2% 
C. Involuntary Creditors 
The inability to modify debilitating charter provisions is most troubling 
when we recognize that not all creditors choose to extend credit. Most will have 
done so voluntarily, of course. Where creditors contract (or have the meaningful 
opportunity to do so ex ante), duty claims make little sense and should rarely lie. 
They will (and should) be displaced by the terms of the contract or other creditors' 
remedies.  As discussed in Part III.B.3, above, the Delaware cases on duties to 
creditors rely increasingly on the notion that creditors have (or will have had) the 
opportunity to negotiate for all the contractual protection they want. This is 
consistent with Delaware courts' more general embrace of freedom of contract. Thus, 
Delaware courts often say that parties can contract around fiduciary duties that 
might otherwise be imposed under Delaware common law.297 
Moreover, certain creditors - chiefly senior institutional lenders and banks ­
will have structured or financed many of the transactions that are likely to create the 
greatest problems in the future (high leverage, securitization). Should they - of all 
people - be allowed to assert claims against directors of the very corporations they 
aided in transactions they now claim violated some fiduciary duty? 
296 I do not view application of the business . jud�n:ent rule-also a feature of Production Resources -as problematic in the same way. Fust, It JS a wa� that courts presume 
that directors have caused no (or no meaningful) harm to the corporatJOn. The exculpatory 
charter clause, by contrast, has force chi�fly v.:hen there h�s already been harm. It says �hat 
the directors will have no liability, even 1f their gr�ss _n�gh!Sence does harm the corporation. 
Second, and more important, it  is a product of JUdJ<:�al mvenhon:-not . shareholder vote. 
Ne1ther shareholders nor creditors can create the protechon of the busmess JUdgment rule. As 
noted, exculpatory clauses exist only if added to the charter; they (unlike the business 
judgment rule) can be removed by shareholder (not creditor) vote. 
297 Take the example of preferred stock. Cases like Equity-Lir1ked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997) say that directors may act for the benefit _of common stockholders, even though the action may harm preferred stockholders. Not bem!S residual 
c_laimants (common stockholders), Char:cellor Allen he!? there that preferred cr�?Jtors were 
hm1ted to the terms of their contract with the corporatwn. 7_
05 A._ 2d at 1 04�. ( [w]h1�e the 
board in these circumstances could have made a d1fferent busme�s JUdgme�t, m my opmwn, 
it violated no duty owed to the preferred in not doing so. The speCJal protechons offered to the 
preferred are contractual in nature."). 
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Of course not. 
The corollary, however, is that we should take directors
' duties to creditors 
most seriously when creditors lack the opportunity to con
tract. Involuntary 
creditors, in particular tort claimants and terminated low-level emp
loyees, would 
not realistically have bargained with the debtor, ex ante, about either the extension of 
credit or the level of risk they were willing to take in relation to the debtor'
s assets. 
In most cases, they cannot assign or otherwise liquidate their claims (" exit").
298 If I 
am correct that we increasingly tolerate contractual exceptions to " a bsolu te" priority, 
the mere fact that these claimants are unsecured creditors provides no great 
assurance that they will have any meaningful recovery if the debtor is distressed.299 
Indeed, it would appear that contract increasingly assures that they w ill end up a 
corporation's true residual claimants - or worse. 
This could have real bite. If, for example, companies make products that 
create serious harm, incur massive tort liability, yet fail to take action to prevent or 
remedy this harm, and insolvency results, leaving tort creditors unpaid, perhaps a 
breach of duty claim should lie. Today, cases like Gliccwalla would appear to make 
that all but impossible. Recall that Gheewalla indicated that creditors could pursue 
breach of duty claims against directors of a distressed firm only if they were either 
derivative or, if direct, the creditor had effectively obtained a jud gment against the 
corporate debtor.300 We have already seen that limiting credi tors to derivative claims 
creates serious problems, including that recoveries on such claims would likely be 
captured by senior (e.g., secured) creditors. If creditors must obtain a judgment to 
bring a direct breach of duty claim, we can effectively exclude many tort creditor�, 
whose claims are often contingent and unliquidated when a bankruptcy case 
IS 
commenced. 
The consequences are both inefficient and unfair. As to the economics, it 
is 
well understood that the ability to externalize costs leads to i nefficient, slop
py 
investing. Translated to this context, if directors of distressed firms have no reaso
n to 
fear breach of duty suits from tort creditors, we would understand if they felt 
tempted to cause their corporations to make harmful products. Directors shoul
d .be 
expected under these circumstances to take short-run, v alue-maximizing strat
egies 
�hat may create long-term costs if those costs are home only by parties legallY 
mcapable of asserting claims against the directors who created or permitte
d the 
harm in the first place. 
The cun:ent plight of involuntary creditors offends one of the exp
ressive �ss�r;s 0
.
£ �r��z t  Lyonn
.
ai� .. Recall that a key message of the case was a?
oul 
PP turusm. the poss1b1hty of insolvency can do curious things to incenhv
es, 
298 S o · t ' · d't rs' inabili 
ee Ire� ors I?uhes, supra note 5, at 1242-1248 (discussing certain ere 1 0 ty �� seS ll or ass,1gn1 c
la1ms against corporate debtor) ee genera y zd. · 
300 For a detailed des · ti f cnp on o Gheewalla, see supra Part I.C.3. 
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e�posing 
,
;��dito�s to risks of �pportunistic behavior and creating complexities for 
d1recto
_
rs.
. . 
�1le we want duectors to have wide discretion to manage the firm 
when It IS m distress, we also want them to have due regard for the claims of 
creditors, especially if we take the priority-duty model as seriously as we say. It is 
difficult to imagine more tempting targets of opportunism than involuntary 
creditors - especially if directors know they are virtually immune from liability to 
them. 
Conclusion 
It should by now be apparent that in all but a few special cases, directors' 
duties to creditors create serious problems if treated in conventional doctrinal terms. 
Indeed, but for the expressive attributes of Credit Lyonnais and progeny, I think the 
cases make little doctrinal sense. Courts - whether those in Delaware or otherwise ­
should say that ordinarily, directors have no worries about personal liability to 
creditors. Perhaps they should, as in Production Resources, continue to rattle the saber 
a bit in extreme cases. But with limited exceptions, they should encourage parties to 
rely on well-formed contracts - and not provide windfalls or unbargained-for 
protections to creditors. 
The exceptions - that involuntary creditors may deserve the protection of 
fiduciary duty when a firm is distressed - is a point I have made elsewhere, and will 
not belabor here.302 The point here has been to explore why courts - and in 
particular, Delaware courts - say so much about directors' duties to creditors, when 
they do not need to or do not appear to mean what they say. The answer appears to 
be that these courts are engaged in an expressive exercise, an attempt to work out the 
very complex interaction between priority, duty and contract. While recent decisions 
may have gone a bit too far, the better norms expressed by these cases create the 
opportunity for judging in this context that is both efficient and fair. Let us hope the 
Delaware courts - and those who look to Delaware for guidance - believe their 
rhetoric. 
Postscript 
As this Article was going to press, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an 
opinion affirming the Chancery Court's decision in the Gheewal/a case discussed in 
parts I. C.3 & IV.A, above.303 In Gheewalla, the Chancery Court held that, as a matter 
301 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.Y. v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., No. 1 2 1 50, 1 991 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
302 See Directors ' Duties, supra note 5. . 
303 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programmmg Found., Inc. v. Rob Gheewalla, _ A.2d -' 2007 WL 1453705 (Del. May 1 8, 2007) affg 2006 WL 2588971 (Del. �h. Sept. �, 2006). For ease of 
reference, 1 will cite in this postscript to the Supreme Court opmwn as Ghet.'walla Supreme 
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of law, creditors cannot pursue direct claims agains
t d irectors of a distressed 
corporation. The Supreme Court not only affirmed this h
old ing, bu t may have gone 
beyond it, in at least two ways. 
First, the Supreme Court suggested that, as a matter of law, creditors
 cannot 
pursue any duty claims against directors that arise w hen a corporation is in the 
"zone of insolvency." The lower court had assumed that creditors co
uld pursue 
derivative duty claims arising during this pre-insolvency period . 1114 The Supre
me 
Court apparently disagreed: "When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zo
ne 
of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: d i rectors must 
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corpora tion and i ts shareholders 
by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corpomtimr _(tJr tile benefit of 
its shareholder owners."305 This language is broader than the statl•d holding of the 
opinion: " [W]e hold that the creditors of a Delaware corpora tion that is eithe
r 
insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, a s  a matter of law, to assert 
direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the co rpo ra tion 's d i rectors."306 But 
if, as the Supreme Court later says, directors of a corporation i n  the " zone" are to act 
"in the best interests of the corporation," and to maximize value for "5/rareho/ders," 
creditors should have no basis for asserting any duty c l a ims - direct or derivative ­
against directors. 
Second, the court apparently narrowed the duties that d i rectors do owe to or 
for the benefit of corporate creditors when the firm is actua l ly  insolvent. The lower 
�ourt had tracked Prod�ction Resour�es' subrogating l angu age abou t  the ef
fect � 
msolvency, namely that It causes creditors to "step into the shoes of" shareholders. 
According to the Gheewalla Supreme Court, however, creditors only " take the place 
?f t�e shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of am; increase in Z'alue."308 This 
Impl�es a narrower frame of duty than was suggested
. 
by Prod11clion Resources or 
Credzt Lyonnazs. 
Court," and to the Chancery Co rt · · "G that are not Clea W tl d 
u opmwn as heewal/a Chancer!{ Court . "  For reasons d r, es aw rnounte two id ti 1 · · · · th secon cited at 2007 WL 1454454 1 will . 
en ca verswns of the Supreme Court opiniOn, e 
304 
· ate only to the first 
. See Ghetwalla Chancery Court, 2006 WL 
.
2588971 t * 1 2  1 12 ("the Court mere�y presumes, m the text above th t d. ' a ' n .  · ns 1.11 the vicinity of · 1 ' a stan_ mg would be available to creditors of corpora
no 
mso vency to assert denv ti. I . . ") 305 See Ghe 11 S a ve c auns on behalf of the corporatiOn. 
. 
306 
See 
id. ��/("
::J':e;:ze Court, 2007 � 1453705, at *7 (emphasis ad�ed) . . either 
insolvent or in the zone of inso 
old that the cred_ttors of a Delaware corporatwn that IS claimS 
for breach of fiduciary duty a 
l_vency have no ':gh�, as a ma tter of law, to assert drred 
307 See Ghetwalla Clw�ams
t the corporation s directors.") . . o)venl 
corporation are "placed 'in th 
eery Court, 2006 WL 2588971, at * 1 2  (creditors of the tns ·dual 
risk-bearers'" (quoting Pr d �
shoes normally occupied by the shareholders - that of r�\Del. 
Ch. 2004))). 
0 · es. Group, L.L.C. v. NCf Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 79 
300 See id. 
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The Supreme Court's rationale reflects concerns about directorial discretion 
to maxirrtize value and negotiate with creditors. "To recognize a new right for 
creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims against [an insolvent corporation's] 
directors," the court explained, " would create a conflict between those directors' 
duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those 
having an interest in it, and the newly recognized direct fiduciary duty to individual 
creditors."309 This would suggest that value maximization - even at the expense of 
creditors - may be acceptable after all. Moreover, directors should be unburdened by 
fiduciary constraints when negotiating with creditors. " Directors of insolvent 
corporations must retain the freedom to engage in vigorous, good faith negotiations 
with individual creditors for the benefit of the corporation."3Jo 
There is, as discussed in Part II.B.l, something odd about Gheewalla. It is not 
clear that the plaintiff was a creditor,311 or that the defendants were capable of acting 
in a directorial capacity .m The Chancery Court devoted about half of its analysis to 
the question of standing in the case of a debtor in the vicinity of insolvency.313 But it 
is not clear why this matters if the corporation here was actually insolvent. The 
plaintiff' s real goal may have been to reach Goldman Sachs, the defendants' 
employer, and a large investor in the corporation. If so, fiduciary duty may have 
formed only a small part of the real dispute. One rrtight be forgiven for thinking that 
Gheewalla was taken to the Supreme Court as a pretext for addressing - and 
limiting - directors' duties to creditors. 
What does Gheewalla mean? It might mean an end to the expressive 
experimentation undertaken by the Delaware Chancery Court discussed in this 
Article. Now, we know that directors of Delaware corporations may be unburdened 
by any duties to corporate creditors when the firm is in the zone of insolvency, and 
have a quite limited duty to corporate creditors even if the firm is insolvent. 
This is likely to present little problem, as and to the extent creditors are 
parties to well-formed contracts. But, like the Gheewalla Chancery Court decision 
discussed in Part IV above, the Gheewalla Supreme Court opinion leaves gaps. 
Among other things, the Gheewalla Supreme Court ignores the fact that (i) dire�torial 
acts or orrtissions may directly harm creditors in the same ways that they d1rectly 
harms shareholders; (ii) bankruptcy law and the rights of senior lienholders will 
interfere with unsecured creditors' ability to pursue derivative claims; (iii) it is not 
309 See Gheewalla Supreme Court, 2007 WL 1453705, at *8. 
3JO See id. . . . . 
311  See Gheewalla Chancery Court, 2006 WL 2588971, at *1 (charactenzmg plamtlff as 
"putative creditor"). See also Gheewalla Supreme Court, 2007 WL 1453705, at *1 (same). 
312 The three directors sued were not a majority of the board. Gheewa/la Chancery 
Court, 2006 WL 2588971, at *1 . Instead, the plaintiff cl�ime� _th�t 
the defendants effectively �ad 
the power to control the corporation by virtue of theu afhhatlon w1th Goldman Sachs, wh1ch 
was allegedly its "only source[) of funding." ld. 
313 See id. at *ll-14. 
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clear how creditors could satisfy the pre-suit demand requ iremen t of
 Rule 23.1;314 
and (iv) most important, contract cannot and will not protect in vol un tary (e.g., tort) 
creditors. 
Gheewalla may be telling us that Delaware does not care about  these gaps. It 
may mean that Delaware does not take seriously the " opportunism" that concerned 
Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais or the "animus" that concerned Vice Chancellor 
Strine in Production Resources. This would be ironic. Recal l  thc1 t  in Production 
Resources, Vice Chancellor Strine viewed directors' d ut ies to creditors as "not 
unproblematic" because they " [a]rguably . . .  involve[)  u si n g  the law of fiduciary 
duty to fill gaps that do not exist."3Js The corollary, however, is that d u ty should fill 
gaps to remedy inequitable conduct when there is no meaningfu l remedy at law. 
Gheewalla nevertheless uses fiduciary doctrine to make this more d i fficu l t . We can 
only hope this is not the last word on the subject. 
. 314 As ?isc�ssed � text at note 68, supra Delaware's Rule 23.1 requires shareholders pursumg a denvativ� action to make demand on the board before pu rsu ing the cla1m on behalf of the corporation. Perhaps here demand is to be excused as a matter of law because the rule _speaks only of sJw�eholders (not creditors) and it would be futi le to imagine tha
t a 
corporation woul� pursue drrectors on behalf of creditors' claims. We cannot sav, because the Supreme Court f�Jled to address the issue. Nevertheless, as discussed above, this was an issue that concerned VJce Chancellor Strine in Production Resources. Sec Prod . Res. Group, L.L.C. V­NQ Gro_up, Inc., 863 A_.2d ?'72, 795-96 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("For example, assuming that a claun �at r�dltors are asserting IS one belonging to the firm, does that mean that creditors must P ea . eman? excusal under Rule 23.1? The parties have not burdened me with input on thiS prease question.") . 
315 See Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 789-90. 
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